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Abstract
In this thesis we walk a historical path along the main stages of
the integrability of demand theory, starting with the work of G. B.
Antonelli and arriving to Preference, Utility and Demand by Hurwicz
and Uzawa. In doing this we examine the main results of this branch
of Microeconomics both from a theoretical and a mathematical point
of view. Furthermore we determine the relation between the utility
maximization framework and the revealed preference approach on the
one side and the links between this latter and individual decision
making theory on the other side.
The theory of the Integrability of demand deals with the problem of re-
covering a utility function from a consumer demand by assuming speciﬁc
properties on this latter. The idea is that, by using a process of mathe-
matical integration, it is possible to prove the existence of a function from
which the demand could be derived. This problem was ﬁrst mathematically
handled by G. B. Antonelli in 1886 in his Sulla Teoria Matematica della
Economia Politica (cfr. [1]).
From that moment onwards, this theory became the object of the study of
many economists as it was revealed as a fundamental part of microeconomic
theory in a sense that we will specify hereinafter.
The classical approach to the individual decision making theory in Mi-
croeconomics uses the utility maximization framework. We consider an econ-
omy with n goods whose prices are given by a positive real numbers vector.
In this economy an agent is endowed with a certain income and he will choose
his demand taking into consideration all these parameters. It is possible for
the consumer to express his preference through a so-called utility function,
in a way which we will explain later on. The preferred consumptions are now
the solution of the maximization of the utility function subject to the budget
constraint.
In the lights of this result the theory of integrability gains importance
for two main reasons.
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First, is it possible to obtain a utility function from the demand? That
is, does it make sense to move in a opposite sense with respect to the process
described above?
Second, it is useful to answer to the critics of the utility maximization
approach. In fact the utility maximization approach in the study of con-
sumer behavior is sometimes criticized as a lot of scholars think the notion
of utility is a psychological measurement and cannot be observed, and thus,
they think the demand function from utility maximization is meaningless
(cfr. [8]).
In this thesis we will answer to both questions. In fact we will present
Theorem 7.2 to analyze the ﬁrst one. What about the second? The integra-
bility result tells us that a utility function can be derived from observable
data on demand although the utility function is not directly observable.
I will follow two lines in developing this sketch on the Integrability of
demand theory. On the one hand I will go through an historical approach,
while on the other I will develop some mathematical-technical aspects in such
a way that the two paths complete each other.
The ﬁrst section is a sketch of the individual decision making theory
mentioned above. Some familiar results are recalled, such as the deﬁnition of
utility function (cfr. Def. 1.1) and its properties or the Utility Maximization
Problem (cfr. 1.2). In Proposition 1.8 two fundamental properties of the
so called Slutsky Matrix are introduced (symmetry and negative semidef-
initeness). Throughout this work we will refer often to these two concepts.
We assume the notions presented in Section 1 to be familiar to the reader;
therefore we will not dwell in this sense on this subject. Anyone interested in
exploring this topic can refer to Microeconomic Theory by A. Mas-Colell et
al. (cfr. [14]). Using the deﬁnitions and the results proposed in chapter 1, it
will be better clariﬁed how the problem of integrability appears. In fact the
reader can notice that the equations in (1.4) allow us to get the utility func-
tion we are looking for as the integral of the inverse demand function, where
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the marginal utility of wealth represents the corresponding integrating fac-
tor. By analogy we can get the indirect utility function from the equations in
(1.5) as the integral of the demand, or the expenditure function as the exact
integral of the hicksian demand as showed in (1.9). These three integration
processes are possible only when some speciﬁc hypoteses are satisﬁed. We
will consider all the details during the discussion of this thesis.
Let me also highlight that the notation adopted in this ﬁrst chapter will
be maintained as far as possible throughout all the work.
After this mandatory introductory chapter we will present Sulla Teoria
Matematica dell'Economia Politica by Giovan Battista Antonelli, which is
nowadays considered the ﬁrst fundamental contribution to the development
of the Integrability of demand theory. G. B. Antonelli (San Miniato,1858-
Cassano Spinola,1944) was student of mathematics at the Scuola Normale
Superiore di Pisa and then he studied on to graduate as engineer at the
Politecnico di Milano. He left us as legacy two theoretical works: the Nota
sulle relazioni indipendenti tra le coordinate di una forma fondamentale in
uno spazio di quante si vogliono dimensioni e sulla forma normale di una
funzione omogenea di essa and Sulla Teoria Matematica della Economia
Politica (1886). It is likely to believe that his work remained unknown to
most of the economists for a long time, at least until some distinguished
scholars such as Allen, Hicks, Georgescu-Roegen, Samuelson, Houthakker
direct their studies to the Integrability problem. Vilfredo Pareto faced,
without much success, the topic in its Manuel d'èconomie politique (cfr.
[15]) in a way that is probably completely independent from the work of
Antonelli. V. Volterra took part to the discussion on integrability of demand
bringing some criticisms to the work of Pareto in his [23]. After that we have
to wait 30/40 years before the integrability conditions (cfr. 2.23) presented by
the Tuscan mathematician are recalled. In the second chapter of this thesis
we will present in detail the theoretical-mathematical description used in the
Sulla Teoria Matematica della Economia Politica. In this introduction we
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just want to stress how the author was ingenious in posing, more or less
consciously, the problem of the derivation of utility from visible data.
We will ﬁll the time gap between between Antonelli and the other inte-
grability problem authors by presenting two chapters in which we describe
the main results of the Revealed Preference theory. The idea is to build a
great circle, or even better, a large triangle through which we will be able to
link several fundamental results. The reader is welcome to analyze chapter 3
and 4 in this sense. The importance of the Revealed Preference theory will
emerge along the path and will be re-emphasized in the last chapter, where
the design I was talking about, will be completely clariﬁed. No wonder if
the pioneer of this branch of microeconomics was the same Samuelson men-
tioned above. The American economist in his A Note on the Pure Theory of
Consumer's Behavior (cfr. [17]) introduced the Weak Axiom of Revealed
Preference (WARP) by saying thatif an individual selects batch one over
batch two, he does not at the same time select two over one . The idea
behind this deﬁnition is simple. If we suppose that an agent chooses a cer-
tain consumption x over y when both bundles of goods are aﬀordable, he has
somehow revealed his preference for x over y. Once again this approach could
be seen as one possible answer to the utility maximization framework critics
in a sense which we are going to specify further on. Let us just mention that
many negative comments has been made moving in the direction according
to which Instead of replacing "metaphysical" terms such as "desire" and
"purpose," (embodied in the concept of utility) he used it to legitimate them
by giving them operational deﬁnitions(cfr. [8]). In Proposition 3.2 we show
the equivalence between the WARP and the compensated law of demand
under usual hypotheses. This property cannot be extended to the diﬀeren-
tial case. In this sense in Proposition 3.3 we prove that WARP implies the
negative semideﬁniteness of the Slutsky Matrix, while through Example 3.1
the reader can immediately infer that the opposite implication is not always
valid. We notice that some further assumptions would be required. In this
iv
respect we cited the work of Mas-Colell et al. (cfr. [14]) where the equiv-
alence between the negative semidiﬁniteness of the Slutsky Matrix and the
Weak Axiom is proved under the hypothesis of the symmetry of the same ma-
trix. This assumption, with the exception of the case of a 2-goods economy
where it is superﬂuous (cfr. Proposition 3.5), is revealed to be crucial in the
general framework. It is important for the reader to keep this result in mind
as it will be used when we will summarize all our analysis in the last chapter
of the thesis. Meanwhile we want to highlight the economical meaning of
the hypotheses made so far. The symmetry of the Slutsky Matrix may be
seen as the equality in the change of the compensated demand of a certain
good with respect to a change in price of another good on the one hand and
the the change of the compensated demand of the latter with respect to a
change in price of the former on the other hand. Furthermore the intuition
behind the negative semideﬁniteness of the Matrix is the negative eﬀect on
the compensated demand of one good with respect to its own price together
with the largest weight of this eﬀect over the eﬀect on the demand of the
same good with respect to the prices of the other goods.
At this point we will make a further jump in order to close this large
parenthesis on revealed preference. Our choice is to present the work by
H. Uzawa (cfr. Ch.1 of [3]) as we retain it to be complete and exhaustive
in a way we will specify hereinafter. Meanwhile we want to mention some
historical-theoretical aspects that we consider fundamental to have a clear
framework. When Samuelson introduced the Weak Axiom his idea was to
ﬁnd a way to go through the path drawn by the utility maximization theory
along a parallel track. What immediately emerged is that assuming the
validity of the weak axiom in consumer behavior is a condition too weak to
imply utility maximization. In this respect H. S. Houthakker introduced in
[10] a generalization of WARP. The Strong Axiom (SARP), in some sense,
extends the rationality incorporated in the WARP to a broader meaning. In
fact if on the one hand through the Weak Axiom the consumer reveals his
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choice between two available consumption bundle x, y (xRy) on the other
hand through the SARP the agent expresses the same preference by using
a ﬁnite sequence of relations. Indeed we can assume the existence of some
intermediate goods x0, x1...xs for which holds xRx0, x0Rx1, ..., xsRy. In
this case we will say that x is indirectly revealed preferred to y (xR∗y). In
chapter 4 we essentially create a bridge between two worlds: on the one bank
the consumer's demand, on the other one his preference. In fact Theorem
4.1 shows how the indirect revealed preference relation R∗ may be deduced
(cfr. Deﬁnition 4.4) from a given demand function. The other way round,
given a preference relation, Theorem 4.6 guarantees the existence of a derived
demand function. The Strong Axiom plays a fundamental role, indeed it is
a requirement in Theorem 4.1 and it is implied in Theorem 4.6. In this
respect it seems inappropriate to omit a discussion on [10] by Houthakker.
Our decision is related to the fact that Lemma 4.1 is completely based on
the procedure used by the Dutch economist and we retain it superﬂuous to
repeat this kind of reasoning. The other hypotheses required in Theorem
4.1 are usual assumptions on the demand. Note that we provide a proof of
the theorem with weaker conditions (cfr. Note 4.2) with respect to those
used by Uzawa. In the same chapter Theorem 4.4 gives an other important
result in Revealed Preference theory. In fact it explains the extent to which
WARP and SARP are equivalent. Let us recall that in [4] D. Gale provides an
example where he proved that the two concepts are diﬀerent. The equivalence
holds only in the case of a 2-goods-economy as it is shown by Rose in [16].
We then return to the analysis of the integrability of demand by pre-
senting the work of N. Georgerscu-Roegen (cfr. [5]). Let us just recall that
the results we are going to present would not be possible without some fun-
damental contributions, such as those of Slutsky in [21] and Hicks & Allen
in [9]. When [5] was published in 1936 it did not gain much success. In fact
we can retain Georgescu's work a little bit pioneristic. Samuelson, in some
sense, revalued [5] when he mentions that he was inspired by this work in
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completing his [18]. The approach of the Roumanian statistician is original
and deeply diﬀerent from that of his predecessors. Chapter ﬁve of this thesis
is an attempt to read [5] in a familiar way maintaining as much as possi-
ble the originality of the author. Georgescu makes some hypothesis on the
demand of the consumer and starting from this point he tries to construct
some indiﬀerence surfaces, representing the agent's preferences. The idea
behind all his work is to consider the behaviour of the consumer around a
point, through what we can call a local analysis. We present both a graph-
ical framework (2-goods-economy) and a more mathematical-theoretical one
(for the case of 3 or more goods). Given a point M (in the plane, space,
etc.), which represents the demand of the consumer, we look for the prefer-
ence/nonpreference/indiﬀerence directions. The idea is that the consumer,
when it is possible, would move on the preference directions. These move-
ments are in some sense prevent by the constriction due to the budget plane
passing through the point we are considering. By assuming some continu-
ity/convexity hypotheses (cfr. Note 5.1, Note 5.2) it is possible to establish a
connection between this budget plane (or better the inﬁnitesimal-near point
to M) and the preference directions (cfr. 5.16). We will construct the in-
diﬀerence surfaces by shaping them on the indiﬀerence directions. We
can ask how this work is linked to the [1] by Antonelli. The mathematical
Appendix of [5] provides a more traditional analysis of the suﬃcient condi-
tions for the integrability problem. The integral of the diﬀerential form in
(5.2) is exactly the solution of the system of diﬀerential equations (cfr. 2.7)
the Tuscan mathematician was looking for. Despite this premise we must
highlight that the two authors arrive to two diﬀerent conclusions. Antonelli
gives his integrability conditions(cfr. 2.23) in term of the symmetry of the
Slutsky Matrix while Georgescu takes into consideration some assumptions
on the negative semideﬁniteness of the same matrix (cfr. Note 5.3). Please
note that the work, where the Slutsky equation is presented (cfr. [21]), is
posterior with respect to Antonelli's (cfr. [1]). We ask the reader to make a
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leap in time and check the connection between the equations in 2.23 and the
symmetry of the Slutsky Matrix we considered above.
We want to mention that in 1946 J. Ville published The Existence-
Conditions of a Total Utility Function, which is an attempt to solve the
problem of recovering a utility function from a consumer's demand. In this
work the author starts by assuming some hypoteses such as homogeneity,
budget exhaustion and continuity, and he proves that the integrability con-
ditions of an expression like (6.8) is equivalent to the absence of closed con-
tours along which this expression is constant (cfr. pp.127-128, [22]). The
interested reader can deepen this analysis by analyzing the English version
of [22] reviewed by K. J. Arrow in 1947.
Chapter 6 presents an analysis of [18] by Samuelson. Since we decide to
consider a pure-mathematical approach we want to mention the main eco-
nomic aspects behind the work in this introduction. First, let us note that
we consider [18] as the most complete and conscious introduction to the in-
tegrability problem, at least among those presented up to that moment.
The author begin his work by considering the problem of integrability in the
case of a 2-goods-economy (prices are ﬁxed at pA1 , p
A
2 ). In this framework we
have a consumer, endowed with a positive income MA, choosing a certain
consumption bundle, deﬁned as A. Under these hypotheses it is possible to
construct the budget line, passing through A, as a straight line with slope
equal to the price ratio −pA1
pA2
. At this point, we can repeat this construc-
tion for every point B,C, ... chosen by the consumer when the income is
given by MB,MC , ... and prices are (pB1 , p
B
2 ), (p
C
1 , p
C
2 ), ... Now, as Samuelson
states, If the observed price ratio p1
p2
is given as the following continuous
and diﬀerentiable function of the two goods, B(x1, x2), then mathematical
analysis assures us that the diﬀerential equation dx2
dx1
= −B(x1, x2) gives rise
to a unique family of curves. In two dimension there is no integrability prob-
lem... the order of consumption, in the sense of the path along which the
consumer actually moves behind the scenes of the market-place, has nothing
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to do with the problem of integrability versus non-integrability. This last
speciﬁcation wants to eliminate any possible misunderstandings regarding
the two diﬀerent concepts of order of consumptions and path-dependency
in the integrals (cfr. [18]). We want to stress that the basic idea behind
this reasoning is that we can think of the indiﬀerence curves we are looking
for as the envelope of a family of budget lines. Next step will be the case
of a 3 − goods − economy. The situation in this framework could become
a little bit more tricky. We proceed in a way that is analogous to the 2-
goods-economy case. In fact we will still be able to observe the preferred
consumptions once prices and income are given. Hence it will be possible
to construct the budget planes as the 3 − dimensions case of the budget
lines. Before trying to answer the question can the indiﬀerence surfaces be
thought as the envelope of a family of budget planes? we want to clarify
some speciﬁcation on the nature of the demand we are considering. In fact
in what we have exposed so far it is assumed that the consumer is able to
decide which is his preferred consumption. In particular he should choose,
for any situation, if a certain option A is better/indiﬀerent/worse than an
other possible B (complete preference). Furthermore we request that a tran-
sitivity condition is valid. As we already said the 3-dimension-case is not so
obvious. In chapter 6 we present Samuelson's integrability conditions (cfr.
6.16). It will be possible to show that an envelope of a family of budget
planes gives origin to these surfaces. At this point we just want to propose
the intuition behind the process. Given a demand triple A and the corre-
sponding budget plane, then by using Samuelson's words We need only
indicate at A a little button, or better still a little thumbtack, whose back or
head lies in the budget plane and whose point tell us which is the preferred
direction. At this point our integrability problem would be to ﬁnd if it is
somehow possible to join together these thumbtack to construct a what we
called indiﬀerence surface. We invite the reader to reﬂect on the equiva-
lence between the integrability conditions proposed by Antonelli (2.23) and
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those presented by Samuelson (cfr. 6.16). Despite the fact that the second
ones are the result of a more complete and thoughtful reasoning the results
obtained are the same in the two cases. Samuelson integrability conditions
essentially require the symmetry of the Slutsky Matrix. Chapter 7 shows
how this result is incomplete as it bypasses the crucial assumption of the
negative semideﬁniteness of the same matrix.
Chapter 6 of [3] represents the end of the dispute on the integrabil-
ity of demand problem, as it presented an exhaustive answer to our initial
questions. The framework of the analysis is the most general one, that is,
we consider an n-goods-economy where prices are given in the positive oc-
tant and income is a positive real number. The authors assume some usual
hypotheses on the consumer's demand function, such as single-valuedness,
budget exhaustion and diﬀerentiability. In Theorem 7.1 the symmetry and
the negative semideﬁniteness of the Slutsky Matrix is deduced starting from
constrained preference maximization, while in Theorem 7.2 the existence of a
utility function is obtained starting from the assumptions of the the symme-
try and the negative semideﬁniteness of the same matrix. In particular this
last theorem is the key through which we can conclude all the analysis made
so far. As the mathematical framework is completely developed in chapter
7 we want to stress the main economical-theoretical implications behind this
fundamental result. To this end let us consider one by one the hypothe-
ses required. As we mentioned above we consider the usual assumptions
on single-valuedness, budget exhaustion and diﬀerentiability of the demand.
These hypotheses are usual in the sense that, if removed, we would not be
able to present the problem in (7.16). Before analyzing the other assump-
tions we invite the reader to reﬂect on what kind of problem we are facing
and on all the implications deriving from this fact. Indeed the integrability
problem is essentially an existence problem, a fact that obliges us to move
along a constructing proof. The assumption on diﬀerentiability should be
analyzed under this light. Any student familiar with calculus will recognize
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this hypothesis as crucial in showing the existence of a solution for the dif-
ferential system in 7.16. At this point the hypotheses on the symmetry of
the Slutsky Matrix and the lipschitzianity one will gain the important role of
guaranteeing the unicity of the solution (cfr. Lemma 7.1, Lemma 7.2). The
idea is that our unique solution will be used to deﬁne the utility function we
are looking for. Next step will be to prove that what we have obtained may
really be considered as a utility function. Let us just note that we believe
that Samuelson in [18] left this point open and this is why his work cannot
be considered exhaustive. The hypothesis on the negative semideﬁniteness of
the Slutsky takes a fundamental role in this sense. In Lemma 7.4 before and
in Lemma 7.7, Lemma 7.8 after it is shown how under this assumptions it
is possible to consider the function we take as our utility function as well-
deﬁned. In fact we show that the value of the function introduced in (7.43) is
independent from the system of prices/income considered (cfr. Lemma 7.7).
What we obtained is exactly what we were looking for: a utility function
from which the demand is derived. Our decision is to completely focus on
this result and to provide the proof of Theorem 7.2 in this respect. We limit
ourselves to provide the statement of Theorem 7.3, Theorem 7.4 and Theo-
rem 7.5. These results regard essentially the properties that are possible to
deduce for the utility function deﬁned in Theorem 7.2.
As our problem can be considered as solved in the last chapter of this
thesis we will summarize all the results obtained so far and put them all
together in order to provide the reader a complete framework of analysis.
We thought this chapter as something in its own right, in such a way that
it could be read as separate from all the rest. We omit all the mathematical
procedures to make it elegant, but full of intuitions.
xi
.CONTENTS:
1. Preliminary Results 1
2. Sulla Teoria Matematica della Economia Politica, G.B. An-
tonelli 9
3. Revealed Preference theory 18
4. Utility, Demand and Preference, Ch.1, H. Uzawa 35
5. The Pure Theory of Consumer's Behaviour, N. Georgescu-
Roegen 54
6. The Problem of Integrability in Utility Theory, P.A. Samuel-
son 64
7. Utility, Demand and Preference, Ch. 6, L. Hurwicz & H.
Uzawa 73
8. Conclusions 90
1 Preliminary Results
We will brieﬂy recall some fundamental results in microeconomic theory. We
will give just a sketch as these themes should be familiar to any economics
student.
First, we want to specify some points in the notation we will use.
Let us note that a preference relation is, in general, a binary relation on
a set of alternatives X. We will denote by xRy the relation x is weakly
preferred with respect to y. The expression xPy will instead be used to
express a strong preference for x over y.
What about the connection between these two concepts?
Starting from R we can derive two other relations:
i) The strong preference relation mentioned above, by deﬁning
xPy iff xRy but not yRx;
ii) the indiﬀerence relation, ∼, by deﬁning
x ∼ y iff xRy and yRx.
By analogy it is possible to deﬁne the weak preference relation using the
strong one. In fact it is possible to deﬁne the former as:
j) xRy iff yPx (= xP
−1
y),
where yPx stands for y is not strongly preferred to x.
We want to specify that in all the thesis the weak preference relation is
considered as primitive.
We will consider a 1-agent economy with n consumption goods, whose
prices are given by a vector p ∈ Rn++, and the consumer's income is a positive
real number M. Some modiﬁcations will be introduced here and there when
necessary.
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Deﬁnition 1.1 A function u : X ⊆ Rn+ −→ R is a utility function
representing the preference relation R iﬀ
xRy iff u(x) ≥ u(y), for every x, y ∈ X.
Proposition 1.1 Let u( ) be a utility function representing the pref-
erence relation R, then
R is rational, (1.1)
where rational means that it satisﬁes:
1. Completeness
2. Transitivity
Proof The previous results are immediate consequences of Deﬁnition
1.1 and the properties of real numbers.
What can we say about the other way round? The so-called Lexicographic
Preference (cfr. chapter 3, [15]) is an example of complete preference rela-
tion for which it is not possible to have a corresponding utility function.
Deﬁnition 1.2 The preference relation R is said to be continuous iﬀ
for every couple of sequences (xn)n∈N, (yn)n∈N in X, withxnRyn for every n = 0, 1, 2, ...limn→∞ xn = x, limn→∞ yn = y, ,
it results xRy.
Proposition 1.2 Let R be a rational, continuous preference relation on
X, then:
there exists a continuous utility function u ( ) representing the preference
relation. (cfr. [13])
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We will not provide the proof of Proposition 1.2.
Note that there are inﬁnitely many utility functions for R and not all
continuous. In fact it is suﬃcient to apply a strictly increasing (not necessarly
continuous) transformation to the function u ( ) obtained above to get a new
utility function representing R.
Viceversa it is possible to prove the continuity of the preference relation
R starting from the continuity of the utility function u ( ) .
Deﬁnition 1.3 The preference relation R on X is said to be locally
nonsatiated if for every x ∈ X and for every positive real number ε there
exist y ∈ X such that
‖ y − x ‖≤ ε and yPx.
The usual Utility Maximization Problem is stated in these terms: we
consider an economy where prices are set at p = (p1, p2, ..., pn) ∈ Rn++ and
we assume the consumer has a rational, continuous and locally nonsatiated
preference relation with a available income M > 0. Let u ( ) represents a
utility function for preference R. Then the agent would face the problem
(UM)p,M
maxx∈Rn+ u(x)s.t. px ≤M . (1.2)
We will term demand correspondence the correspondence that assigns to
each couple (p,M) ∈ Rn++ × R+ the set of the solutions of (1.2) and we will
denote it as x (p,M) .
We can use Kuhn-Tucker conditions to solve the systems in (1.2). In
particular when we have an interior optimum (x∗ ∈ Rn++) it must be
∇u(x∗) = λp, (1.3)
where λ is a so-called Lagrange multiplier.
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We can restate (1.3) as:
δu(x(p,w))
δp1
p1
= ... =
δu(x(p,w))
δpn
pn
= λ = µ(p, w), (1.4)
where we named µ(p, w) the marginal utility of wealth.
Proposition 1.3 Let x (p,M) be the demand correspondence for sys-
tem (1.2), wher u( ) is assumed to represent a locally nonsatiated preference
relation. Then the following properties hold for every (p,M) ∈ Rn++×R+:
h) x( ) is homogeneous of degree zero with respect to (p,M) ;
hh) px = M, for every x ∈ x(p,M) .
Deﬁnition 1.4 Under the hypotheses made so far for the deﬁnition
of the demand correspondence we can deﬁne the indirect utility function
v : Rn++ × R+ −→ R as v(p,M) = u(x), with x ∈ x(p,M).
When we diﬀerentiate the indirect utility function with respect to one
price pi (i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}), after some algebraic manipulation, we get:
δv(p, w)
δpi
= −µ(p, w)xi(p, w), for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} . (1.5)
By analogy when we diﬀerentiate the indirect utility function with respect
to wealth we have:
δv(p, w)
δw
= µ(p, w) (1.6)
In a way completely similar to what we did for (1.2) we can deﬁne the
expenditure minimization problem as
(EM)p,u
minx∈Rn+ pxs.t. u(x) ≥ u¯ , (1.7)
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where u is exogenously given.
We will term hicksian correspondence he correspondence that assigns to
each couple (p, u) ∈ Rn++ × R the set of the solutions of (1.3) and we will
denote it as h (p, u) .
Deﬁnition 1.5 We will deﬁne the expenditure function e : Rn++ ×
R −→ R+ as e(p, u) = px′, with x′ ∈ h(p, u).
Proposition 1.4 Let h ( ) be the function deﬁned above. Then the
following properties hold:
g) h( ) is homogeneous of degree zero in p;
gg) u(x) = u, for every x ∈ h(p, u) .
Proposition 1.5 Let e ( ) be the function deﬁned above. Then the
following properties hold:
k) e ( ) is homogeneous of degree one in (p, u);
kk) e ( ) is increasing in u and nondecreasing in pi, i ∈ {1, ..., n} ;
kkk) e ( ) is concave in p;
kkkk) e ( ) is continuous in p, u.
In constrained optimization, it is often possible to convert the primal problem
(i.e. the original form of the optimization problem, as the one presented in
UM) to a dual form, which is termed the dual problem (EM). The following
theorem is a duality theorem in this sense.
Theorem 1.1 Suppose that u( ) is a continuous utility function repre-
senting a locally nonsatiated preference relation R deﬁned on the consump-
tion set X = Rn+ and the price vector is p ∈ Rn++. We have:
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j) if x∗ is optimal in the UM when wealth is w > 0, then x∗ is opti-
mal in the EM when the required utility level is u(x∗). Moreover,
the minimized expenditure level in this EM is exactly w;
jj) if x∗ is optimal in the EM when the required utility level is u >
u(0), then x∗ is optimal in the UM when wealth is px∗. Moreover,
the maximized utility level in this UM is exactly u.
Using Theorem 1.1, we can relate the hicksian and the walrasian demand
correspondences as follows:
h(p, u) = x(p, e(p, u)) and x(p, w) = h(p, v(p, w)) (1.8)
Using the ﬁrst equality in 1.8 and the properties of the expenditure func-
tion it is possible to get:
δe(p, u)
δpi
= h(p, u), for every i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} . (1.9)
Deﬁnition 1.6.I A preference relation R on X is said to be convex if
for every x, y, z ∈ X, with yPx, zPx, it is
[αy + (1− α)z]Px, for any 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Deﬁnition 1.6.II A preference relation R on X is said to be strictly
convex if for every x, y, z ∈ X, with yRx, zRx, y 6= z it is
[αy + (1− α)z]Px, for any 0 < α < 1.
Note 1.1 The hypothesis of strict convexity is fundamental in the sense
that it allows us to handle single-valued functions instead of multi-valued
functions. In fact when strict convexity holds we have that the problems
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(1.2) and (1.3) have only one solution and we can consider x(p,M) and
h(p, u) as functions in the usual sense.
Proposition 1.6 Let's suppose that u ( ) is a continuous utility func-
tion representing a rational, locally nonsatiated, strictly convex preference
relation R. Let h ( , u) = (h1 ( , u) , h2 ( , u) , ..., hn ( , u)) be continuously dif-
ferentiable in (p, u). Then
i) Dph(p, u) = D
2
ppe(p, u);
ii) Dph(p, u) is negative semideﬁnite;
iii) Dph(p, u) is symmetric;
iv) Dph(p, u)p = 0,
where Dph(p, u) =
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
dh1
dp1
dh1
dp2
.... dh1
dpn
dh2
dp1
dh2
dp2
... dh2
dpn
... ...
dhn
dp1
dhn
dpn
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
.
Proposition 1.7 Let us suppose that u ( ) is a continuous utility func-
tion representing a regular, locally nonsatiated, strictly convex preference
relation R. Then for all (p,M) and u = v(p,M) it is
Sij (p,M) =
dhi(p, u)
dpj
=
δxi(p,M)
δpj
+
δxi(p,M)
δM
xj(p,M),
for every i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} . (Slutsky Equation) (1.10)
Proposition 1.8 Let's suppose that u ( ) is a continuous utility function
representing a regular, locally nonsatiated, strictly convex preference relation
R. Then the Slutsky Matrix S(p,M) = [Sij (p,M)]i,j=1,...,n satisﬁes
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j) Symmetry;
jj) Negative Semideﬁniteness;
jjj) S (p,M) p = 0.
It is intuitive to deduce Proposition 1.8 as a direct consequence of Proposition
1.6 and 1.7.
We will provide a Proof for a proposition equivalent to Proposition 1.8 as
presented by Uzawa and Hurwicz in [3].
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2 Sulla Teoria Matematica della Economia Po-
litica, G.B. Antonelli
The problem of the Integrability of demand arguments starts with con-
sumer demand functions having some properties that would be implied by
constrained utility maximization were they generated from that source. Us-
ing a process of mathematical integration, the arguments then proceed to
demonstrate the existence of utility functions from which those demand func-
tions could be derived. This problem concerns whether one can recover a
preference ordering that generates the given demand function. In 1886, G.
B. Antonelli deals with the problem from a mathematical point of view.
Antonelli opened his Sulla Teoria Matematica dell′Economia politica
(cfr. [1]) saying Molti economisti hanno sostenuto e sostengono essere im-
possibile di trattare i problemi della Economia politica per mezzo dell'Analisi
matematica. Malgrado la loro asserzione a priori molti e svariatissimi ten-
tativi di questo genere furono pubblicati ﬁno da molti anni;...Queste riﬂes-
sioni generali mostrano che non è vano il tentare una Teoria matematica
dell'Economia Politica, anche se in un primo studio si debbono supporre
condizioni ed ipotesi in parte più semplici, o non conformi completamente
alla realtà. Nel caso particolare è poi bene riﬂettere che a questi studi si
riconnettono dei problemi per la cui risoluzione nessun metodo scientiﬁco si
possiede, e relativamente ai quali dei risultati anche approssimativi sarebbero
di grande vantaggio. As sustained by J. A. Schumpeter in [19] Antonelli's
work represents a remarkable performance that seems to anticipate later
work in some important point.
We want to present the main contents of the Sulla Teoria Matematica
dell′Economia politica based on the commentary of G. Demaria and G. Ricci
(cfr. [1]), authors of the notes of the reprinted edition of Antonelli's work.
We will focus our attention on the particular case of a 3 goods economy
trying to generalize the main conclusions to the more complete framework
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of an n-goods-economy. When we consider 3 goods we face a market with
a triple of prices (each one referred to a single good) and a wealth level.
The two parameters we use will be the prices ratios. For each couple of
these values, given the initial agent endowment, we have a preferred triple
of consumed goods. The idea is to pass from these choices of quantities
to a map of indiﬀerence surface. In order to make this step the so called
integrability conditions must be satisﬁed. As in the commentary of G. Ricci
we split Antonelli Postulate into two diﬀerent assumptions (cfr. P.1 and P.2).
The idea is that they are valid in diﬀerent situations and they bear diﬀerent
implications. When P.1 is veriﬁed we can write the integrability conditions
but only when both P.1 and P.2 are valid it is possible to construct the map
of U.
THE MODEL
Let us consider a market with n = 3 commodities. The general case will
be an extension of this particular situation.
We denote with a1, a2, a3 the quantity of the 3 goods. Prices are assumed
to be positive and equal to p1, p2, p3. The consumer has an initial endowment
a1, a2, a3 implying that he is to face a budget constraint λ = p1a1+p2a2+p3a3.
Let us compute the ratio between prices q1 =
p1
p1
= 1, q2 =
p2
p1
, q3 =
p3
p1
. The
agent will have a net demand/supply (depending on the sign) function C1,
C2, C3, each corresponding to one of the three commodities. The condition
expressed by the budget constraint will be reﬂected in the demand/supply
function as
p1C1 + p2C2 + p3C3 = 0; (2.1)
the preferred consumption vector will be
A1 = a1 + C1, A2 = a2 + C2, A3 = a3 + C3. (2.2)
Hence, given λ and vector p the individual can choose between all the
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triple (a1, a2, a3) satisfying
p1a1 + p2a2 + p3a3 = λ. (2.3)
Let's introduce Antonelli's ﬁrst Postulate
P.1 for each λ, (p1, p2, p3) the consumer chooses the three quantities
(a1, a2, a3) in a unique way in order to get the preferred triple.
We want to present a geometric interpretation of the assumptions made so
far.
We can think of the mathematical formula (2.3) as the equation of a plane
(the generalization to hyperplanes in the case of more than 3 commodities
will be straightforward) whose direction cosines are represented by the price
vector p and λ gives us a measure of the distance from the origin.
If the prices are ﬁxed we get the optimal choice of the consumer by varying
the level of λ and using P.1 we can describe a curve Γ with equation
A1 = A1(λ, p1, p2, p3), A2 = A2(λ, p1, p2, p3), A3 = A3(λ, p1, p2, p3) (2.4)
What the author assumed is essentially that:
 consumer choices are homogeneous of degree zero with respect to (prices,
income);
 whatever initial situation (a1, a2, a3) , such that
∑n
i=1 piai = λ, given
prices, the consumer chooses the same preferred triple (A1, A2, A3).
Hence, using (2.2) and (2.3) we haveCi = −ai + Ai(λ, p1, p2, p3) i = 1, 2, 3;∑3
i=1 piAi =
∑3
i=1 piai = λ
(2.5)
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where (a1, a2, a3), as speciﬁed in the second equality are chosen as initial
points.
By diﬀerentiating (2.3) and (2.4) with respect to ai (i = 1, 2, 3) we get
δλ
δai
= pi,
δAk
δai
=
δAk
δλ
δλ
δai
= pi
δAk
δλ
, k = 1, 2, 3
Hence from (2.5)
δCi
δai
= −1 + δAi
δλ
pi,
δCi
δaj
=
δAi
δλ
pj, i, j = 1, 2, 3 i 6= j,
and solving for δAi
δλ
we get
(1+
δCi
δai
)
pi
=
δCi
δaj
pj
, i, j = 1, 2, 3 i 6= j, which is
equivalent to the following system of diﬀerential equations
(1+
δC1
δa1
)
p1
=
δC1
δa2
p2
=
δC1
δa3
p3
δC2
δa1
p1
=
(1+
δC2
δa2
)
p2
=
δC2
δa3
p3
δC3
δa1
p1
=
δC3
δa2
p2
=
(1+
δC3
δa3
)
p3
(2.6)
which in case of n commodity bundles is
(1+
δC1
δa1
)
p1
=
δC1
δa2
p2
= ......... =
δC1
δan
pn
δC2
δa1
p1
=
(1+
δC2
δa2
)
p2
= ......... =
δC2
δan
pn
...................................................
δCn
δa1
p1
=
δCn
δa2
p2
= ......... =
(1+
δC3
δa3
)
p3
(2.7)
The system (2.6) with the equation in (2.1) guarantees suﬃcient condition
which C1, , C2, C3 must satisfy.
When we make prices vary, considering P.1, we get a curve Γ(p1, p2, p3)
given by the equations in (2.4).
Without any loss of generality, we can pass from considering (p1, p2, p3)
as independent variable to (q1, q2, q3) = (1, q2, q3). Hence, from (2.4) we get
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a new system of equations
A1 = A1(λ, q2, q3), A2 = A2(λ, q2, q3), A3 = A3(λ, q2, q3). (2.8)
Let us now consider the Jacobian matrix
Jλ,q2,q3(A1, A2, A3) =
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
δA1
δλ
δA2
δλ
δA3
δλ
δA1
δq2
δA2
δq2
δA3
δq2
δA1
δq3
δA2
δq3
δA2
δq3
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ , (2.9)
and the partial Jacobian matrix
Jq2,q3(A1, A2, A3) =
∥∥∥∥∥ δA1δq2 δA2δq2 δA3δq2δA1
δq3
δA2
δq3
δA2
δq3
∥∥∥∥∥ . (2.10)
When we consider the case of n consumption goods we have
Jλ,q2,q3,..,qn(A1, A2, ..., An) =
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
δA1
δλ
δA2
δλ
... δAn
δλ
δA1
δq2
δA2
δq2
... δAn
δq2
... ... ... ...
δA1
δqn
δA2
δqn
... δAn
δqn
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
. (2.11)
When the matrix (2.10) has rank=2 or, by analogy, (2.11) is full rank it
is possible to apply the implicit function theorem to the system of equation
(2.8), so that there exist two functions Q2 ( ) and Q3( ) such that
q2 = Q2(A1, A2, A3), q3 = Q3(A1, A2, A3), (2.12)
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and in the general case
q2 = Q2(A1, A2, ..., An)
q3 = Q3(A1, A2, ..., An)
.................................
qn = Qn(A1, A2, ..., An)
. (2.13)
We now consider the second Antonelli Postulate:
P.2 There exists a function U( ) of the quantity (a1, a2, a3) that, given
the price vector p and the level λ, assumes the maximum value
on the point (A1, A2, A3) , that is the preferred triple.
We will proceed as following:
we maximize the utility function on the plane characterized by (p1, p2, p3)
and λ and then we impose that the value that maximizes the utility function
is exactly the triple (A1, A2, A3).
Let use the usual Lagrangian multipliers method.
L(µ,A1, A2, A3) = U(A1, A2, A3)− µ(p1A1 + p2A2 + p3A3 − λ)
F.O.C.s read
δL
δA1
=
δL
δA2
=
δL
δA3
=
δL
δµ
= 0,
that is
δU
δA1
− µp1 = 0, δU
δA2
− µp2 = 0, δU
δA3
− µp3 = 0,
equivalent to the following conditions:
δU
δA1
= µp1,
δU
δA2
= µp2,
δU
δA3
= µp3. (2.14)
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Rearranging (2.14) we have:
δU
δA1
δU
δA2
=
p1
p2
=
1
q2
,
δU
δA1
δU
δA3
=
p1
p3
=
1
q3
. (2.15)
Since we know that the maximum is realized when equations (2.12) are
satisﬁed, we get
δU
δA1
=
1
Q2
δU
δA2
,
δU
δA1
=
1
Q3
δU
δA3
. (2.16)
Note 2.1 Equations (2.16) can be stated in the general case (n com-
modities) as
δU
δA1
=
1
Q2
δU
δA2
,
δU
δA1
=
1
Q3
δU
δA3
, ... ,
δU
δA1
=
1
Qn
δU
δAn
. (2.17)
Hence when the function U exists conditions (2.16) must be satisﬁed.
We want to ﬁnd some kind of integrability conditions for the equations
in (2.16). Let's assume that both Q2( ) and Q3( ) admit ﬁrst order continuous
partial derivatives; then diﬀerentiating both sides of the two equations with
respect to A1we get the system:
δ2U
δA1δA2
= Q2
δ2U
δA21
+ δQ2
δA1
δU
δA1
δ2U
δA3δA1
= Q3
δ2U
δA21
+ δQ3
δA1
δU
δA1
. (2.18)
Now, taking the derivative of the ﬁrst equation in (2.16) with respect to
A3 and of the second one with respect to A2 we have: δ
2U
δA2δA3
= Q2
δ2U
δA1δA3
+ δQ2
δA3
δU
δA1
δ2U
δA3δA2
= Q3
δ2U
δA1δA2
+ δQ3
δA2
δU
δA1
. (2.19)
When we assume the utility function U ( ) have continuous mixed deriva-
tives on its domain (cfr. Schwarz Theorem, [20]) we have from (2.19):
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Q2
δ2U
δA1δA3
+
δQ2
δA3
δU
δA1
=
δ2U
δA2δA3
=
=
δ2U
δA3δA2
= Q3
δ2U
δA1δA2
+
δQ3
δA2
δU
δA1
,
implying
Q2
δ2U
δA1δA3
−Q3 δ
2U
δA1δA2
+
δU
δA1
(
δQ2
δA3
− δQ3
δA2
) = 0. (2.20)
Substituting the equations in (2.18) into (2.20) we have (under Schwartz
Th. hypoteses):
Q2(Q3
δ2U
δA21
+
δQ3
δA1
δU
δA1
)−Q3(Q2 δ
2U
δA21
+
δQ2
δA1
δU
δA1
) +
δU
δA1
(
δQ2
δA3
− δQ3
δA2
) = 0,
from which we get
δU
δA1
(
δQ3
δA1
Q2 − δQ2
δA1
Q3 +
δQ2
δA3
− δQ3
δA2
) = 0. (2.21)
If we exclude the trivial case δU
δA1
= 0 equation (2.21) will give the
integrability condition
δQ3
δA1
Q2 − δQ2
δA1
Q3 +
δQ2
δA3
− δQ3
δA2
= 0. (2.22)
Note 2.2 It is possible to generalize equation (2.22) for the case of
n commodities bundles. We have to extend the equation obtained for the
indices 2 and 3 to all pairs (k, l) ranging in (2, 3, ..., n) getting the following
system of equations:
δQl
δA1
Qk − δQk
δA1
Ql +
δQk
δAl
− δQl
δAk
= 0, k, l = 2, 3, ..., n (2.23)
Equations (2.23) represent the
(
n− 1
2
)
integrability conditions we
were looking for.
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Note that these conditions are only necessary. The reader will have a
more complete framework when Theorem 7.2 will be presented.
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3 Revealed Preference theory
In studying consumer behavior we usually start from a model where we have
a preference-based-approach. The agent is assumed to have a certain mental
structure (preferences) that allows him to make choices. Preferences, in this
case, are not observable. Starting from making some assumptions on this
unknown preference structure we try to predict the consumer demand, that
is of course observable. In this context we want to present the opposite
process, that is, we will focus on the available data we have.
The main idea is that the consumer, in some sense, grants his explicit
preference to a choice inside the set of all alternatives. Through this choice
he provides critical information about his tastes. In this respect we speak of
Revealed Preferences.
Samuelson in [17] introduced the the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference
(WARP) as follows:
Deﬁnition 3.1 WARP holds iff for every price vector p0, p1, income
M0,M1 and single-valued demanded consumption bundles x0 6= x1 satisfying
p0x1 ≤ p0x0 it is
p1x0 > p1x1 (3.1)
This kind of assumption guarantees that the consumer is in some sense
coherent. In fact when WARP is valid the agent grants his preference to a
certain consumption bundle over an other one whenever both are available.
This property eliminates the possibility that the consumer chooses a certain
bundle x0 over x1 in one situation and then x1 over x0 in a second period.
Let us now suppose that WARP holds. We want to investigate the con-
sequences we can obtain from this assumption.
We will denote by the vector x(p,M) = (x1(p,M), x2(p,M), ..., xn(p,M))
consumer's choice of good 1, 2, ..., n, when prices are given by p = (p1, p2, ..., pn)
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and the available income is M. It is obvious to see that if we assume that
the agent use all his income and WARP is valid the function x(p,M) is
homogeneous of degree 0 in prices. In fact let us consider the following:
Proposition 3.1 Let us be given a price vector p = (p1, p2, ..., pn) and
a positive incomeM. If
i) all income is spent;
ii) (3.1) is veriﬁed;
then for each i = 1, 2, ..., n xi(p,M) = xi(tp, tM), for every positive t.
Proof Let's suppose that x0 is chosen when the system of prices is p0
and income is given by M0,
x0 = x0(p0,M0), (3.2)
while x1 is chosen at p1 = tp0, M1 = tp0, where t is a positive real number,
x1 = x1(p1,M1) = x1(tp0, tM0). (3.3)
Using i)
tp0x1 = p1x1 = M1 = tM0 = tp0x0 = p1x0. (3.4)
Hence, from (4): p0x1 = p0x0p1x1 = p1x0 . (3.5)
Ab absurdo, let's assume that x0 and x1 are diﬀerent consumption bun-
dles. Using ii) in the ﬁrst equation of (3.5) we have
p1x0 > p1x1,
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that is in contradiction with the second equation in (3.5). Hence, it is x0 = x1,
that is, the function is homogenous of degree 0.

We want now to show a fundamental property deriving from WARP: the
substitution eﬀect of own price changes cannot be positive. In this sense we
will show that the substitution matrix is negative semideﬁnite. We proceed
through two main steps. At ﬁrst we work with a ﬁnite variation of prices
and demand, then we will deal with the diﬀerential case. Let us recall the
following deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 3.2 Let A ∈ Cnxn be a (symmetric) quadratic matrix, A is
said to be negative (semi)definite iff
x∗Ax <(≤) 0, for every vector x ∈ Cn, x 6= 0, (3.6)
where x∗ is the conjugate transpose of x.
Note 3.1 the deﬁnition of a negative (semi)definite matrix is usually
given for symmetric matrix. In our case we would not make this kind of
assumption when it is not required.
When the consumer faces a variation of prices he will generally change
his choices due to budget constraint problems.
We will deﬁne a compensated price change as following
Deﬁnition 3.3 A couple (p1,M1) is said to be a compensated price
change from (p,M) if
p1x(p,M) = M1. (3.7)
We will say (p1,M1) ∈ Φ(p,M) iff (p1,M1) is a compensated price
change from (p,M) .
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The idea is that at the new system of prices and income the consumer is
allowed to pursue (by spending all his income) the same bundle he chose at
the initial situation.
Let us show the negative semideﬁnitness of the substitution matrix through
the following proposition
Proposition 3.2 Given a price vector p = (p1, p2, ..., pn) and a positive
income M. Let
j) x(p,M) be homogeneous of degree 0;
jj) all income be spent;
then it is
WARP is valid iff
for any (p1,M1) ∈ Φ(p,M) it is (3.8)
(p1 − p)(x1 − x) ≤ 0, with < for x1 6= x,
where x1 = x(p1,M1), x = x(p,M)
Proof Let us prove the two implications.
 The only if part
When x = x1 we have (p1 − p)(x1 − x) = 0 and the result is obvious.
Hence, let us suppose x 6= x1. We can rewrite the expression in (3.8) as
p1(x1 − x) − p(x1 − x). Using jj) and the deﬁnition of compensated price
change it is
p1(x1 − x)− p(x1 − x) = M1 −M1 − p(x1 − x) = −p(x1 − x). (3.9)
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By deﬁnition (3.7) we have that the consumer can choose x at the price,
income couple (p1,M1) , so that it is possible to use WARP to obtain
px1 > M. (3.10)
From (3.9), using again jj), we have:
− p(x1 − x) = px− px1 = M − px1 < 0. (3.11)
(3.11) gives the proof of the only if part of the proposition.
 The if part
Let us ﬁrst prove that WARP holds when it is considered the compensated
price change.
In order to show that WARP is valid let assume
px1 ≤ px, (3.12)
that is px1 − px ≤ 0, equivalent to p(x1 − x) ≤ 0. Using the hypothesis
in (3.8) we have (p1 − p)(x1 − x) < 0, implying
p1(x1 − x) < p(x1 − x) ≤ 0. (3.13)
Hence
p1x1 < p1x, i.e.WARP holds. (3.14)
We will proceed using an ab absurdo proof. By supposing that WARP is
violated we will construct a speciﬁc compensated price change which makes
(3.8) fail.
Let's consider two pairs (p1.M1) , (p2,M2) which do not satisfy WARP.
Then let us consider x1 = x (p1.M1) , x2 = x (p2,M2) . As WARP is not valid
it is p1x2 ≤ p1x1, p2x1 ≤ p2x2, or by using jj)
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p1x2 ≤M1, p2x1 ≤M2. (3.15)
When one of the inequalities in (3.15) is satisﬁed as equality we fall once
again in the previous case ( the compensated price change one).
Hence it must be
p1x2 < M1, p2x1 < M2. (3.16)
Let's choose a convex combination of the prices p1, p2 p = αp1 +(1−α)p2
in such a way that it results
px1 = px2, (3.17)
and let M = px1 = px2.
Using (3.16), jj) and the deﬁnition of p we have
αM1 + (1− α)M2 > αp1x1 + (1− α)p2x1 = M =
= px(p,M) = αp1x(p,M) + (1− α)p2x(p,M). (3.18)
Two possible cases arise:
1. p1x(p,M) < M1 or
2. p2x(p,M) < M2.
Let's consider 1. We have that, from (3.17), px1 = M and p1x(p,M) ≤M1.
We immediately see that we fall once again in the case of the violation of
WARP for the compensated price.
When we analyze case 2. we get the same result. Hence we get the if
part.

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We can restate the expression (p1−p)(x1−x) ≤ 0, (for every compensated
price changes) by deﬁning the compensated law of demand :
4p4x ≤ 0. (3.19)
What we have seen so far is the equivalence between WARP and the
compensated law of demand.
The next step will be consider the generalization of this result to the
diﬀerential case.
We want to prove
Proposition 3.3 Let assume x(p,M) to be diﬀerentiable. If
j) all income be spent;
jj) WARP is valid;
then the Slutsky Matrix S(p,M) is negative semideﬁnite, where S(p,M) =
Dpx(p,M) +DMx(p,M)x(p,M).
Proof We can restate (3.19) as
dpdx ≤ 0, (3.20)
where dp represents a diﬀerential change in prices and what we called a
compensated change can now be expressed as
dM = x(p,M)dp. (3.21)
Let us consider the total diﬀerentiation of x(p,M), that is
dx = Dpx(p,M)dp+DMx(p,M)dM. (3.22)
Substituting (3.21) in (3.22) we get
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dx = [Dpx(p,M) +DMx(p,M)x(p,M)]dp, (3.23)
and multiplying both sides of (3.23) by dp, in consideration of (3.20), it
is
dpdx = dp[Dpx(p,M) +DMx(p,M)x(p,M)]dp ≤ 0. (3.24)

We have substantially proved by (3.24) that WARP implies the negative
semideﬁnitness of the Slutsky Matrix.
The implication of Proposition 3.2 is unique, in the sense that some fur-
ther assumptions must be considered in order to deduce WARP from (3.24).
We will present this framework later (cfr. Theorem 3.1, Theorem 3.2, Theo-
rem 3.3, Theorem 3.4, Example 3.1, Example 3.2).
Let's also note that in general we do not have the symmetry of the Slutsky
Matrix by using the assumptions made so far.
What can we say in this respect?
We would like to present ﬁrst this preliminary result:
Proposition 3.4 Let us assume x(p,M) to be diﬀerentiable. If
j) all income be spent;
jj) the Slutsky Matrix S(p,M) is symmetric
then x(p,M)is homogeneous of degree 0.
Proof j) is equivalent to ask px(p,M) = M, which gives by diﬀerenti-
ating with respect to pi, i = 1, 2, ..., n
xi(p,M) +
n∑
j=1
pj
δxj(p,M)
δpi
= 0, (3.25)
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and with respect to M
n∑
j=1
pj
δxj(p,M)
δM
= 1. (3.26)
Let's introduce, for a ﬁxed couple (p,M) the following function
fi(t) = xi(tp, tM), for t ∈ R+, (3.27)
where i ∈ {1, 2..., n} .
If we prove that the function deﬁned in (3.27) is constant in t we show
that xi(p,M) is homogeneous of degree 0 for every i ∈ {1, 2..., n} ,which is
equivalent to say that x(p,M) is homogeneous of degree 0.
Let us compute
dfi(t)
dt
=
n∑
j=1
pj
δxi(tp, tM)
δpj
+M
δxi(tp, tM)
δM
. (3.28)
Using j) we have tpx(tp, tM) = tM, that can be restated, dividing both
sides by t, as
n∑
j=1
pjxj(tp, tM) = M. (3.29)
Using (3.29) into (3.28) we have that
dfi(t)
dt
=
n∑
j=1
pj
δxi(tp, tM)
δpj
+
n∑
j=1
pjxj(tp, tM)
δxi(tp, tM)
δM
=
n∑
j=1
pj[
δxi(tp, tM)
δpj
+ xj(tp, tM)
δxi(tp, tM)
δM
], (3.30)
which gives exactly the (i, j)th term of the Slutsky Matrix.
From jj)
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dfi(t)
dt
=
n∑
j=1
pj[
δxi(tp, tM)
δpj
+ xj(tp, tM)
δxi(tp, tM)
δM
] =
=
n∑
j=1
pj[
δxj(tp, tM)
δpi
+ xi(tp, tM)
δxj(tp, tM)
δM
] =
=
n∑
j=1
pj
δxj(tp, tM)
δpi
+
n∑
j=1
pjxi(tp, tM)
δxj(tp, tM)
δM
. (3.31)
Multiplying and dividing (3.31) by t, we get
dfi(t)
dt
=
1
t
[
n∑
j=1
tpj
δxj(tp, tM)
δpi
] +
1
t
xi(tp, tM)[
n∑
j=1
tpj
δxj(tp, tM)
δM
].
Just replacing the two expressions in square brackets with (3.25) and
(3.26) we have
dfi(t)
dt
=
1
t
[−xi(tp, tM)] + 1
t
xi(tp, tM)[1] = 0. (3.32)
(3.32) says that fi is constant. Hence we have the result.

Let us consider what can we say about the opposite implication. That is,
what do we have to request to get the symmetry of the Slutsky Matrix?
We start from the following proposition:
Proposition 3.5 Let's consider a consumer in an economy with only
two goods (n = 2) .
Let x (p,M) be diﬀerentiable. If
i) x(p,M) is homogeneous of degree 0;
ii) all the budget is spent
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then the matrix S (p,M) is symmetric.
In order to prove this Proposition we will use the following
Proposition 3.6 Let x (p,M) be diﬀerentiable. If
i) x(p,M) is homogeneous of degree 0;
ii) all the budget is spent;
then pS(p,M) = 0S(p,M)p = 0 (3.33)
Proof Remember that from ii) we have that (3.25) and (3.26) are veri-
ﬁed. Furthermore i) is equivalent to impose that the expression in (3.28) is
equal to 0, i.e.
n∑
j=1
pj
δxi
δpj
+M
δxi
δM
= 0. (3.34)
By deﬁnition it is
Sij(p,M) =
δxi
δpj
+ xj
δxi
δM
, Sji(p,M) =
δxj
δpi
+ xi
δxj
δM
. (3.35)
The ﬁrst expression in (3.33) can be restated as
n∑
j=1
pjSij(p,M) =
n∑
j=1
pj[
δxi
δpj
+ xj
δxi
δM
] =
n∑
j=1
pj
δxi
δpj
+
n∑
j=1
pjxj
δxi
δM
,
which using (3.34) gives
pS(p,M) = −M δxi
δM
+
n∑
j=1
pjxj
δxi
δM
= (−M +
n∑
j=1
pjxj)
δxi
δM
= 0.
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The last equality is a direct consequence of ii).
In order to verify that the second formula is valid, let us compute S(p,M)p.
We have
S(p,M)p =
n∑
j=1
Sji(p,M)pj =
n∑
j=1
[
δxj
δpi
+ xi
δxj
δM
]pj. (3.36)
Using (3.26) in (3.36) we have
∑n
j=1[
δxj
δpi
+xi
δxj
δM
]pj =
∑n
j=1
δxj
δpi
pj+xi
∑n
j=1
δxj
δM
pj =∑n
j=1
δxj
δpi
pj + xi, and from (3.25) we immediately get S(p,M)p = 0.
Hence we have that both the expression in (3.33) are veriﬁed.

We will now give the proof of Proposition 3.4 as a direct consequence of
Proposition 3.5:
Proof When it is n = 2 the Slutsky Matrix is given by
S(p,M) =
∥∥∥∥∥ S11(p,M) S12(p,M)S21(p,M) S22(p,M)
∥∥∥∥∥ .
Let us observe that it is possible to apply Proposition 3.5. Hence we have:
pS(p,M) = 0, S(p,M)p = 0. (3.37)
Let's restate (37) as these two systems of equations:S11(p,M)p1 + S12(p,M)p2 = 0S21(p,M)p1 + S22(p,M)p2 = 0 , (3.38)p1S11(p,M) + p2S21(p,M) = 0p1S12(p,M) + p2S22(p,M) = 0 . (3.39)
Using (38) and (39) we get the following equalities
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p2
p1
= −S11
S12
= −S21
S22
= −S11
S21
= −S12
S22
.
Hence, rearranging, we have S12(p,M) = S21(p,M), which is exactly the
symmetry of the Slutsky Matrix.

We want to present an exercise to show that the result obtained in Propo-
sition 3.4 is not generalizable to the case of a generic n ≥ 3.
In particular we will deal with a situation of a 3-goods economy. After
the proof of the homogeneity of the demand and of the condition of budget
exhaustion we will show that the Slutsky Matrix associated is not symmetric.
Furthermore we will prove the negative semideﬁniteness of the matrix in
order to link this concept with that of WARP. In particular, we want to
show that even the validity of the Weak Axiom is not suﬃcient to guarantee
the symmetry of the Slutsky Matrix.
Example 3.1 Let consider a prices vector (p1, p2, p3) ∈ R3++and a level
of income M ≥ 0.
We have 
x1(p,M) =
(p2−p1)
p3
;
x2(p,M) = −p2p3 ;
x3(p,M) =
(p2−p1)2
p23
+ M
p3
;
It is straightforward to see that x( ) is homogenous of degree zero.
In fact
x1(tp, tM) =
t(p2 − p1)
tp3
= x1(p,M);
x2(tp, tM) = −tp2
tp3
= x2(p,M);
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x3(tp, tM) =
t2(p2 − p1)2
t2p23
+
tM
tp3
; = x3(p,M);
In order to verify the budget exhaustion condition let's compute px(p,M) =
p1p2−p21−p22+(p2−p1)2+p3M
p3
, which gives exactly
px(p,M) = M.
Since x( ) is diﬀerentiable we can obtain the SlutskyMatrix for our ex-
ample, that is, just remembering (3.35):
S(p,M) =
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
− 1
p3
1
p3
p1−p2
p23
0 − 1
p3
p2
p23
p1−p2
p23
p2−2p1
p23
(p1−p2)2
p33
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ . (3.40)
It is evident that it results S12(p,M) 6= S21(p,M), which is suﬃcient to
say that the matrix deﬁned in (3.40) is not symmetric. We will now show the
negative semideﬁniteness of (3.40) by using the famous result on the minor
of S(p,M) (cfr. [20]).
We have:
1. (−1) | − 1
p3
| = 1p3 > 0;
2. (−1)2
∣∣∣∣∣ − 1p3 1p30 − 1
p3
∣∣∣∣∣ = 1p23 > 0;
3. (−1)3
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
− 1
p3
1
p3
p1−p2
p23
0 − 1
p3
p2
p23
p1−p2
p23
p2−2p1
p23
(p1−p2)2
p33
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
p2p1
p53
> 0.

In order to have a complete view on this framework we will make ref-
erence to the paper by A. Mas-Colell, H.F. Sonnenschein and R. Kihlstrom
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The demand theory of the WARP (cfr. [14]). We will always assume the
hypotheses of
i) homogeneity of degree 0 of the demand;
ii) budget exhaustion.
We already proved in Proposition 3.2 how we can deduce the negative semid-
iﬁniteness of the Slutsky matrix from WARP. The authors in this paper make
a further step by introducing a new deﬁnition. We say that the demand sat-
isﬁes the weak-weak axiom (WWA) condition if
for every p0, p1, when x 6= x′, if p0x1 < p0x0 then it is p1x0 > p1x1.
We immediately get that WWA is implied by the WA (weak axiom).
Let us mention the 3 main results of the paper:
Theorem 3.1 If x( ) satisﬁes WWA then the Slutsky Matrix associated
is negative semidefinite (NSD).
Theorem 3.2 If the Slutsky Matrix associated to the demand function
x( ) is negative definite (ND), then x( ) satisﬁes WA.
Theorem 3.3 If the Slutsky Matrix associated to the demand function
x( ) is negative definite (ND), then x( ) satisﬁes WA.
We can summarize all these results through the following conceptual map:
WA :⇒(β) WWA
⇑ (α) m (γ)
ND :⇒(θ) NSD
. (3.41)
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The implication in (θ) is an immediate consequence of the deﬁnition of
negative deﬁnite/semideﬁnite matrix. The authors also present the following
example to show that the implication in (β) is valid only in one direction.
Example 3.2 Let us consider a vector prices (p1, p2, p3) ∈ R3++and a
level of income M ≥ 0.
We have 
x1(p,M) =
p2
p3
;
x2(p,M) = −p1p3 ;
x3(p,M) =
M
p3
;
It is straightforward to see that x( ) is homogenous of degree zero and the
budget exhaustion is valid.
In order to prove that WWA holds we can show that the Slutsky Matrix
is negative semideﬁnite.
Let us consider
S(p,M) =
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
0 1
p3
−p2
p23
− 1
p3
0 −p1
p23
p2
p23
−p1
p23
0
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ . (3.42)
We can prove the negative semideﬁniteness of the matrix considering the
same criterion used in Example 3.1.
We want to show now that the WA is not valid. Let's consider the two
following prices vectors p0 = (1, 1, 1) p1 = (2, 1, 1), and income M0 = 1,
M1 = 2 We have x0 (p,M) = (1,−1, 1) and x1(p,M) = (1,−2, 2).
It is
p0x1 = 1 = p0x0,
and
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p1x0 = 2 = p1x1.
Hence, WARP is violated.

Please note that for (3.42) it results S12(p,M) 6= S21(p,M), which is
suﬃcient to have the non-symmetry of the Slutsky Matrix. It is shown
by Hurwicz and Uzawa that if it is taken by assumption that the Slutsky
Matrix is symmetric the WA is completely equivalent to the WWA.
Under the hypothesis of Symmetry we have:
WA ⇔ (β) WWA
⇑ (α) m (γ)
ND ⇒ (θ) NSD
. (3.43)
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4 Utility, Demand and Preference, Ch.1, H.
Uzawa
In this chapter we still focus on the Revealed Preference theory by analyzing
chapter 1 of [3] by H. Uzawa. A generalization of Theorem 1 (cfr. Chapter
1 of [3]) will be proposed (cfr. Theorem 4.1). In this preamble we will bore
the reader with an other reference to some of the concepts analyzed in the
previous chapter. We deem it necessary to better converge the reader on the
topic.
Paul A. Samuelson in [17] introduced the Weak Axiom of Revealed Pref-
erence (WARP).
Let us suppose we were in a situation 0 (price and income) where com-
modity bundle x1 could be chosen but commodity x0 actually has been chosen
(xo is revealed preferred to x1) then at the price and income situation 1 at
which commodity bundle x1 is chosen it is impossible to choose commodity
bundle x0(x1 is not revealed preferred to x0).
x0 revealed preferred to x1 means that x0 is chosen when both x0 and x1
are aﬀordable. For x1 not to be revealed to x0 means that when x1 is chosen
then x0 must not to be aﬀordable; that is, the cost of x0 must exceed the
cost of x1 at all prices x1 is chosen. Suppose that x0 is revealed preferred
to x1 at price system p0 and that x1 is chosen at some other price p1. Then
WARP can formally be expressed as:
p0x1 ≤ p0x0 ⇒ p1x0 > p1x1 (4.1)
What the weak axiom indicates is that if x1 is chosen at some price system
p1, then x0 will be more expensive than x1 at prices p1.
A generalization of WARP is introduced by Houthakker in Revealed
Preference and the Utility Function (cfr. [10]).
Houthakker's contribution was to recognize that one needs to extend the
direct revealed preference relation to what he called the indirect revealed
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preference relation. We say that x0 is indirectly revealed preferred to xs
if there exists a ﬁnite sequence of commodity bundles x0, x1...xs such that
xt is directly revealed preferred to commodity bundle xt+1 for every t =
0, 1, ..., s− 1.
It is easy to prove that SARP implies WARP.
We will consider in this section some regularity condition for demand
function under which the converse implication is veriﬁed.
Rose in [16] oﬀered a formal argument that the Strong Axiom and the
Weak Axiom were equivalent in two dimensions, providing a rigorous, alge-
braic foundation for Samuelson's earlier graphic exposure.
Deﬁnition 4.1 Given the vector price and the income the budgetset X(p,M)
is the set of all commodity bundles whose market values evaluated at p do not
exceed incomeM : X(p,M) = {x = (x1, x2, ..., xn) such that xΩ and px ≤M} .
In this chapter we will denote the demand function as h(p,M) in place
of x(p,M). This symbolism is the one used by Uzawa in his work. Note that
no diﬀerences exist between the function we introduced in chapter 1 and the
one we will introduce in the following deﬁnition. The reader is only invited
to take into consideration the properties assumed for the demand here and
there.
Demand function A function x = h(p,M) = h1(p,M), h2(p,M)...hn(p,M)
is a demand function if the following conditions are satisﬁed:
D.I x = (h(p,M)) is a commodity bundle in Ω for any given price
vector p = (p1, p2, ...pn) and income M .
D.II Any commodity bundle x is chosen for a suitable price vector
p = (p1, p2, ...pn) and income M , i.e. x = h(p,M).
D.III x = (h(p,M)) satisﬁes the budget equation ph(p,M) = M, for
all positive price vector and income.
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We will sometimes consider the following stringent condition in place of D.II
D.II' For any commodity bundle x = (h(p,M)) the price vector p =
(p1, p2, ...pn) at which x is chosen, exists and is uniquely deter-
mined except for the multiplication by a scalar.
We will furthermore assume some regularity condition for the demand func-
tion. In particular we will use
D.IV h(p,M) is a lipschitzian function with respect to M .
Note 4.1 The condition presented in D.IV is formally expressed as follow-
ing:
there exist two positive real numbers  and L such that for all p satisfying
‖ p− p0 ‖<  and all M I ,M II with | M I −M0 |<  and | M II −M0 |<  it
holds
‖ h(p,M II)− h(p,M I) ‖≤ L |M II −M I |; (4.2)
h(p,M) is said to be a lipschitzian function with respect toM in (p0,M0) .
Deﬁnition 4.2 Let f(x) be deﬁned on an interval I and suppose we
can ﬁnd two positive constants L and α such that
| f(x1)=f(x2) |≤ L | x1 − x2 |α, for every x1, x2I (4.3)
Then f is said to satisfy Holder condition of order α and we say that fLip(α).
If fLip(1) it is said to be Lipschitz continuous
Proposition 4.1 Let f : Θ ⊆ Rn −→ Rm with:
1. fC1(Θ,Rm);
2. ∃M > 0 such that maxyΘ ‖ Jf (y) ‖≤M
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then fLip(1).
It is straightforward to prove the continuity of a Lipschitz continuous
function (cfr. [10]).
Using the deﬁnition we can also prove that a function satisfying Holder
condition is continuous.
Hence, when it is possible we will consider the following condition in place
of D.IV:
D.IV* h(p,M) satisfy Holder condition of order α with respect to M .
The following proposition gives a class of functions satisfying Lipschitz con-
ditions.
Proposition 4.2 Let us suppose h(p,M) represents a demand function
(satisfying D.I, D.II, D.III) and
1. there are not inferior goods at (p,M);
then f is a Lipschitz continuous function.
Proof Let's consider a variation in income 4M . Using D.III we have
ph(p,M) = M ⇔
n∑
i=1
pihi(p,M) = M (4.4)
ph(p,M +4M) = M +4M ⇔
n∑
i=1
pihi(p,M +4M) = M +4M (4.5)
subtracting (3.4) from (3.5) and dividing both sides by the nonzero quan-
tity 4M we get
n∑
i=1
pi
[hi(p,M +4M)− hi(p,M)]
4M = 1 (4.6)
38
We can observe that we have all positive terms (from the non inferior
goods condition and the positivity of the prices) summing 1.
Hence each term must be not larger than 1, i.e.
pi
[hi(p,M +4M)− hi(p,M)]
4M ≤ 1 (4.7)
Rearranging
[hi(p,M +4M)− hi(p,M)] ≤ 1
pi
4M (4.8)
that is equivalent to the Lipschitz condition for the demand function.

As we already said in the introduction of this thesis we will denote by
x0Rx1
the relation x0 is revealed preferred to x1.
Considering assumption D.II on the demand function we get
for any positive bundles x, yΩ such that x ≥ y it is xRy (4.9)
We will indicate by
x0R∗x1
the relation x0 is indirectly revealed preferred to x1.
It is obvious that
xR∗y, yR∗z implies xR∗z (transitivity) (4.10)
Let us consider 2 systems of prices pa and pb, for any given positive income
Ma we deﬁne the function ρb,a(M
a) as
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ρb,a(M
a) = sup
{
M such that h(pa,Ma)R∗h(pb,M)
}
(4.11)
The function ρb,a( ) associates to any income M
a at price pa the income
ρb,a(M
a) as the supremum of those income at price pb such that the com-
modity bundle h(pa,Ma) is indirectly revealed preferred to the corresponding
commodity bundle h(pb,M).
By analogy we introduce
ρ
′
b,a(M
a) = inf
{
M such that h(pb,M)R∗h(pa,Ma)
}
. (4.12)
As consequence of (4.10) we can deduce that ρb,a( ) is a non decreasing
function of Ma. Furthermore we will say that ρb,a( ) satisﬁes the Regularity
condition (R) if:
for any given price systems pa and pb
the function ρb,a( ) is strictly increasing (4.13)
It is possible to show that if the Weak Axiom is satisﬁed and D.I,...,D.IV
hold then we can restate (4.13) as:
(R') for any price vectors pa, pb the function ρb,a(M
a) is ﬁnite and the
the function ρ
′
b,a(M
a) is continuous.
Let us also note that the Weak and Strong Axiom deﬁned by Samuelson and
Houthakker respectively may be restated in terms of the preference relations
R and R∗ introduced above.
In particular WARP is equivalent to
(W) x0Rx1 implies x1Rx0,
while SARP is given by
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(S) xR∗y implies yR∗x.
These two results are immediate consequences of the deﬁnitions.
As we already make with the demand, we decide to follow's Uzawa ap-
proach and symbolism. In this respect some deﬁnitions or properties of the
preference relations may be stated in a diﬀerent style with respect the one
we used so far.
Preference relations A binary relation P deﬁned on the set Ω is called a
preference relation when the following axioms are satisﬁed:
P.I Irreﬂexibility: for any x ∈ Ω, we have xPx;
P.II Transitivity: for any x, y, z ∈ Ω, with xPy, yPz it is xPz;
P.III Monotonicity: for any x, y ∈ Ω, such that x ≥ y we have xPy;
P.IV (Houthakker) Convexity: for any x, y ∈ Ω, such that xPy, we
have [(1− λ)x+ λy]Px for all 0 < λ < 1;
P.V L-Continuity: for any x0 ∈ Ω the set {x such that xΩ and x0Px}
is an open set in Ω.
We can consider the following in place of P.I
P.I' Asymmetry: for any x, y ∈ Ω, if xPy we have yPx;
The equivalence in considering P.I' instead of P.I is straightforward. In fact,
ab absurdo, suppose that there exists y such that it does not hold yPy, that
is yPy. Then for asymmetry we would have a contradiction. The other way
round let us suppose ab absurdo that asymmetry does not hold. Then there
exist x, y ∈ Ω such that xPy and yPx. Using transitivity we get xPx, which
contradicts the hypotesis of irreﬂexivity.
Notice that in order to have the usual deﬁnition of Continuity we have
to add to axiom P.V the assumption of U-continuity (where U and L stands
for Upper and Lower, respectively):
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P.VI U-continuity: for any x0Ω the set {x such that xΩ and xPx0} is
an open set in Ω.
P.V and P.VI may be substituted by requesting the complementary sets de-
ﬁned above to be closed in Ω.
We want to open a small parenthesis on Preference Relation theory in
order to make it easier for the reader to interpret some results otherwise
unfamiliar. In particular we will make some comparison between the hy-
potheses in P.I, P.II and P.III and the assumptions on the preference relation
R introduced in chapter 1 of this thesis.
Deﬁnition 4.2.I (cfr. [2]) A (weak) preference relation R on Ω is said
to be regular if it is complete, transitive and reﬂexive.
A (strong) preference relation is said to be negative transitive iff
for every x, y, z ∈ Ω, with xPy and yPz it is xPz
Deﬁnition 4.2.II A (strong) preference relation P on Ω is said to be
u− regular if it is asymmetric and negative transitive.
The two following propositions (cfr. [11]) explain the connection between
the two previous deﬁnition
Proposition 4.3 Given a u− regular strong preference relation P , the
strong relation R derived from the weak one (cfr. the Introduction of Chapter
1)
xRy iff (yPx)
is a regular preference
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Proposition 4.4 Given a regular preference R, deﬁne P and ∼ to be
the asymmetric and symmetric parts of R as in chapter 1.
Then P is a u − regular preference and ∼ is an equivalence relation
(reﬂexive, symmetric, and transitive).
Proposition 4.5 Given a u − regular preference P , let ρ(P ) denote
the regular preference P
−1
induced by P ; and given a regular preference R,
let σ(R) denote the u− regular strong preference P induced by R. Then
P = σ(ρ(P )), while
R = ρ(σ(R)).
Note that the regular and u− regular properties are fundamental to get
the results of Proposition 4.5.
Let us come back to our initial problem
Deﬁnition 4.3 Let us consider a price vector p and an income M , and
let P be a preference relation as deﬁned above. A commodity bundle x0 is
said to be optimum with respect to the preference relation P in the budget
set X(p,M) if x0 ∈ X(p,M) and for any x∈Ω, with xPx0 it is x /∈ X(p,M).
The idea is that if I have an optimum x0 there exists no commodity bundles
in the budget set which are preferred to x0.
Deﬁnition 4.4 A demand function h(p,M) is deﬁned as derived from
a preference relations P if for every price vector p and positive income M
the commodity bundle h(p,M) is optimum with respect to P in the budget
set X(p,M).
Theorem 4.1 Let h(p,M) be a demand function satisfying D.I,...,D.IV
and the SARP. Then the indirect revealed preference relation R∗, generated
43
by h(p,M), is a preference relation on the set Ω of all positive commodity
bundles (i.e. R∗ satisﬁes P.I,...,P.V ) and the demand function h(p,M) is
derived from R∗.
Proof In order to prove the theorem we have to show that the preference
R∗ satisﬁes the 5 conditions that characterize a revealed preference relation.
The ﬁnal step is to prove that the demand function h(p,M) is derived from
the indirect revealed preference relation ordering R∗.
We can immediately derive P.II, P.III and P.I' through the properties of
the demand function. We have to prove that also P.IV and P.V are satisﬁed.
In order to prove P.IV we need the following:
Lemma 4.1 Let the demand function h(p,M) satisfy D.I, D.II, D.III,
D.IV* and SARP. Then, for any price vector paand pb, we have:
h(pa,Ma)R∗h(pb,M) for allM < ρb,a(Ma), (4.14)
and
h(pb,M)R∗h(pa,Ma) for allM > ρb,a(Ma), (4.15)
where ρb,a( ) is deﬁned in (4.11)
Proof We can deduce (4.14) by simply using the deﬁnition of ρb,a( )
introduced in (4.11).
In order to show that (4.15) is valid we want
ρb,a(M
a) = ρ′b,a(M
a) for allMa. (4.16)
In fact in this case we could restate (4.15) as
h(pb,M)R∗h(pa,Ma) for allM > ρ′b,a(M
a), (4.17)
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which can be seen as a direct consequence of the deﬁnition of ρ′b,a( ) in
(4.12).
Hence our proof will be focused on showing the validity of (4.16). A
process analogous to what Houthakker used in [10] will be considered.
For any S ∈ N let us consider the following two sequences deﬁned recur-
sively as:
M0S = Ma, x0S = xa = h(pa,Ma)
MK+1,S = p
(K+1)
S xK,S, xKS = h(p
K
S ,MKS), (k = 0, 1, 2, ..., S − 1), (4.18)
where
pt = pa + t(pb − pa), 0 ≤ t ≤ 1. (4.19)
While it is
M0,S = M0S,
MKS = p
K
S xK+1,S, xK+1,S = h(p
(K+1)
S ,MK+1,S), (k = 0, 1, 2, ..., S − 1).
(4.20)
Using D.III in (4.20) we have that
lim
MK+1,S→0
xK+1,S = 0, lim
MK+1,S→∞
xK+1,S =∞, (4.21)
in fact the price vector always ranges between pa and pb. (4.21) implies
lim
MK+1,S→0
MK,S = 0, lim
MK+1,S→∞
MK,S =∞, (4.22)
(4.22) together with the continuity hypothesis of h( ) guarantees the ex-
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istence of a solution for (4.20).
Let us suppose, ab absurdo, that
there exists M˜a such that ρ′b,a(M˜
a) > ρb,a(M˜
a); (4.23)
then we would arrive to a chain of relation such as
h(pb,M)R∗h(pa, M˜a)R∗h(pb,M),
which obviously contradicts the SARP (S).
We can state
ρb,a(M
a) ≤ ρ′b,a(Ma) for allMa. (4.24)
Proceeding through an ab absurdo reasoning it is furthermore possible to
prove that
MSS ≤ ρb,a(Ma) and ρ′b,a(Ma) ≤MSS. (4.25)
From (4.24) and (4.25) we can write the following sequence of disequali-
ties:
MSS ≤ ρb,a(Ma) ≤ ρ′b,a(Ma) ≤MSS. (4.26)
Since the two sequences in (4.18) and (4.20) are deﬁned for every S ∈ N
(4.16) is veriﬁed if the disequalities in (4.26) hold as equality when S diverges,
that is if
lim
S→∞
(MSS −MSS) = 0. (4.27)
Taking into account D.III and the deﬁnition in (4.18), (4.20) we can
compute:
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MK+1,S −MK,S = p (K+1)S xK,S − pKS xK,S = 1
S
(pb − pa)xK,S, (4.28)
MK+1,S −MK,S = p (K+1)S xK+1,S − pKS xK+1,S = 1
S
(pb − pa)xK+1,S. (4.29)
By deﬁning νK,S = MK,S −MK,S we get, subtracting (4.29) from (4.28)
νK+1,S−νK,S = 1
S
(pb−pa)(xK,S−xK+1,S), for any K = 0, 1, ..., S−1. (4.30)
For any j ∈ {0, 1, ..., S − 1} we can compute
j−1∑
K=0
νK+1,S − νK,S = ν1,S − ν0,S + ν2,S − ν1,S + ...+ νj,S − νj−1,S =
= νj,S − ν0,S = νj,S, (4.31)
where the last equality is consequence of ν0,S = 0, and the ﬁrst one can
be restated as
νj,S =
1
S
(pb − pa)
(
(xa − xjS) +
j−1∑
K=1
xK,S − xK,S
)
. (4.32)
Since xaR∗xj,S, we have from (S)
p
j
S xa ≥ p jS xj,S. (4.33)
We deﬁne pj = max
{
paj , p
b
j
}
, j = 1, 2, ..., n and pj = min
{
paj , p
b
j
}
, j =
1, 2, ..., n.
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From (4.33) we can deduce: pxa ≥ pxj,S.
For any j, independently from S we can say
xj,S ∈ Γ = {x such that x ≥ 0, pxa ≥ pxj,S} .
Let
A = max
xΓ
| (pb − pa)(xa − x) |; (4.34)
by considering that h(p,M)Lip(α) with respect to M,
| xKS − xKS |=| h(pK/S,MKS)− h(pK/S,MKS) |≤ L |MKS −MKS |α,
(4.35)
where L and α are two positive real numbers.
We can use (4.31),(4.34) and (4.35) to get
vjS ≤ 1
S
{
A+B(v1S + ...+ vj−1,S)
}
j = 1, 2, ..., S; (4.36)
where Bα = L | pb − pa |α .
Hence, we can get the following recursive formula
vjS ≤ A
S
(1 +
Bα
S
)j−1 j = 1, 2, ..., S, (4.37)
and in particular,
vSS ≤ A
S
(1 +
Bα
S
)S−1. (4.38)
Since limS→∞(1+ B
α
S
)S−1 = eB
α
, we have limS→∞ vSS = 0, that is exactly
(4.27).

48
Note 4.2 The proof of Lemma 4.1 we have provided is based on the one
reported by Uzawa in [3]. The main diﬀerence is that we extend the theorem
to functions satisfying Holder condition and not only Lipschitz-continuous
functions. A large class of functions falls into the ﬁrst category and not in
the second.
Proof (P.IV) We consider two goods xa = h(pa,Ma), xb = h(pb,M b)
satisfying the hypotheses of P.IV, that is:
xaR∗xb, xa 6= xb, (4.39)
Let xc = h(pc,M c) be a convex combination of xa and xb :
xc = (1− c)xa + cxb, c ∈ (0, 1).
Let us consider two possible case:
i) pcxb ≥ pcxa;
ii) pcxb < pcxa;
In case i) we have pcxc = (1 − c)pcxa + cpcxb ≥ pcxa, while in case ii) it is
pcxc = (1− c)pcxa + cpcxb > pcxb.
In case i) it is xcRxa, in fact paxc = (1 − c)paxa + cpaxb > paxa, where
the last inequality is consequence of (4.39). In case ii), by analogy, using the
continuity in M of h(p,M) we have the existence of a positive real number 
small enough such that:
xcRh(pb,M b + ). (4.40)
Considering (4.39) and Lemma 4.1 we have:
h(pb,M b + )R∗xa, for all positive . (4.41)
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Using (4.40), (4.41) and the transitivity of R we have
xcR∗xa.

Proof (P.V) Let us consider any positive commodity bundle xb satis-
fying x0R∗xb. Two possible cases arise:
j) x0Rxb;
jj) there exists x1 such that x0R∗x1, x1R∗xb;
We can consider case j) as part of jj) when we assume x0 = x1.
Hence we have
p1x1 ≥ p1xb, x1 6= xb, (4.42)
being p1 the price vector at which x1 is chosen.
Let
x2 =
x1
2
+
xb
2
,
and compute p1x2 = p1 x
1
2
+ p1 x
b
2
. It is, by using (4.42),
p1x1 ≥ p1x2, x1 6= x2. (4.43)
When we consider WARP for x1, x2, from (4.43) we immediately get
p2x1 > p2x2, (4.44)
where p2 represents the price vector at which x2 is chosen.
Using the deﬁnition of x2 and the disequality in (4.44) we get
p2x2 = p2
x1
2
+ p2
xb
2
> p2
x2
2
+ p2
xb
2
,
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implying:
p2x2 > p2xb. (4.45)
At this point we can say that there exists a neighborhood Ib of commodity
bundles xb such that:
p2x2 > p2x, for all x ∈ Ib;
hence
x0R∗x, for all x ∈ Ib, (4.46)
which is exactly the continuity hypothesis in P.V.

What we get so far is that that if the demand function satisﬁes axioms
D.I, D.II, D.III, D.IV* then for the preference R∗ P.I, P.II, P.III, P.IV, P.V
are all valid. In order to complete the Proof of Theorem 4.1. we left to
prove that the demand function h(p,M) is derived from R∗. The condition
according to which the demand function can be said as derived from a certain
preference relation is stated in Deﬁnition 4.4 in this chapter.
Let x0 be the choice of the consumer when prices and income are given by
the couple (p0,M0), that is x0 = h(p0,M0). For any other commodity bundles
x 6= xo on the budget set it must result x0Rx, which obviously implies x0R∗x.
Viceversa let's consider a certain x0 in the budget set deﬁned by p0 and M0
such that x0R∗x, for all x 6= xo. Then it must be x0 = h(p0,M0). In fact, if
ab absurdo we suppose the existence of xˆ 6= x0 in the budget set such that
xˆ = h(p0,M0) we would violate the SARP.
Our last step consists on showing the unicity of the preference relation
considered.
Let us consider R′ as any preference relation deﬁned on the support of
R∗, from which h(p,M) is derived. When xR∗y we must have, by deﬁnition,
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xR′y. Using the transitivity hypothesis, it must be
xR∗y implies xR′y. (4.47)
Viceversa let us consider two consumption bundles x, y satisfying xR∗y.
By using the construction of Lemma 4.1, we can consider a sequence (yn)n∈N
with
lim
n→∞
yn = y, and ynR∗x, for any n ∈ N.
The hypothesis of continuity in P.V (sequence continuity) and (4.47) guar-
antees xR′y. Hence we have
xR∗y implies xR′y. (4.48)
The unicity of the preference relation is straightforward from (4.47) and
(4.48).

The two following theorems focus on the properties we can deduce for the
demand function. We will not present the proofs.
Theorem 4.2 Let a demand function h(p,M) satisfy D.I,..., D.IV. Then
the SARP implies the continuity of the demand function h(p,M) with respect
to price vector p and M.
Theorem 4.3 Let h(p,M) be a demand function satisfying D.I, D.II',
D.III, D.IV and the SARP. Then the indirect revealed preference relation R∗
satisﬁes Axioms P.I,...,P.VI on Ω.
Theorem 4.4 expresses a fundamental property in Revealed Preference
theory:
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Theorem 4.4 Let a demand function h(p,M) satisfy D.I,...,D.IV. Then
the SARP holds if and only if the WARP and the Regularity Condition (R)
are both satisﬁed.
We would not report the proof as it could be easily deduced by the reader
from Lemma 4.1.
The following two theorems show how, given any preference relation on
the set Ω, it is possible to derive the corresponding demand function.
Theorem 4.5 Let P be a preference relation on the set Ω of all non-
negative commodity bundles satisfying Axioms P.I,...,P.V. Then there exists
a demand function h(p,M) which satisﬁes D.I, D.III and the SARP.
Theorem 4.6 Let P be a preference relation on the set Ω of all nonneg-
ative commodities satisfying Axioms P.I,..., P.VI. Then there exists a demand
function h(p,M) that is derived from the preference relation P. The demand
function h(p,M) satisﬁes D.I, D.II, D.III and the SARP, and it is continuous
with respect to price vector p.
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5 The Pure Theory of Consumer's Behaviour,
N. Georgescu-Roegen
At this point we will try to analyze The Pure Theory of Consumer's Be-
haviour(cfr. [5]) by N. Georgescu-Roegen. Samuelson refers to this article
by saying Professor N. Georgescu-Roegen wrote one of the most important
clariﬁcations of the problem of integrability and also of the even more subtle
problems of transitivity. Until re-reading his article recently I did not realize
how it must have stimulated my own work on the subject.
We will focus our attention on the ﬁrst two sections of the paper as they
are in some sense more directly linked with the problem of integrability we
are interested in.
Georgescu develops a theory for the construction of indiﬀerence surfaces
starting from four suﬃcient hypotheses. As a statistician he builds his work
with several probabilistic/statistic references in a way that can be considered
interesting and for sure original.
We will try to follow his presentation.
THE MODEL
In developing his model Georgescu says Let S be an ordinal and contin-
uous set of combinations, i.e., a set such that any combination Cr belonging
to the set may be completely characterized by its rank r....”
Let us just recall that in mathematics a combination on a given set X
can be thought as a particular way in selecting the elements of X, where the
order of choice is not important.
Hence suppose that S is a set of combinations on a given set X, and the
elements of S are denoted as Cr. Then we should be able to order the com-
binations through the indices r. We will consider the combination (Ca) as
always preferred to combination (Cb) if a > b. (Ca) will be said preferen-
tial. Let us consider the case where the individual faces a third combination
(T ) . Let's assume (T ) is preferred to (Cb) if b < r while (Ca) is preferred to
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(T ) if R < a. Hence we are assuming the possibility of deﬁning two classes
of combinations: those preferred to (T ) and those to which (T ) is preferred.
Georgescu, in this respect, considers the following Postulate:
A. There is a unique combination (Ct) that will separate the non-
preferred combinations from the preferred ones.
Ct will coincide with Cr and CR.
What we say so far may look a little bit  like an end in itself and not
relevant for our Integrability Problem. When we deal with the following
construction the assumption in A. will be clariﬁed. Meanwhile the reader
can thought the Hypothesis in A. as a continuity assumption.
Note 5.1 We want to provide a possible explanation for the ambiguity
the reader will face in using this ﬁrst Postulate. The author is requesting
that our set of combinations is a total order, in such a way that we are able
to construct a ranking for the considered elements. Since the hypothesis in
A. will be used on a continuous set (not countable) our idea is that a more
traditional continuity hypothesis would ﬁt better in this context. Further-
more it is not completely clear the idea behind the choice of considering the
two indices r and R. Our opinion is the author looked for the existence of a
non-singular set dividing the preferred and non-preferred combinations.
We will now face with the more familiar geometrical approach. Let us con-
sider for simplicity a two dimension consumption space, and deﬁneM(x1, x2)
as the initial position of our agent, where (x1, x2) represent the coordinates
of M .
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FIGURE 5.1
At this point the author introduces his second Postulate:
B. There is no saturation point.
Once again this hypothesis is stated in a natural science way more than as
an economical fact. Postulate B. means for that the individual will prefer
to M any other position within the right angle AMˆD, and that he will take
the trouble to move from M(x1, x2) to M(x1 +4x1, x2 +4x2) if he can do
so without any further conditions. On the contrary, M will be preferred to
any combination within the angle CMˆB
Note 5.2 The hypothesis made in B., as the one presented in A., looks
in some sense not appropriate. Without any convexity assumption on the
demand many results would not be achieved in what follows. The reader
should assume convexity when necessary in the rest of this chapter.
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Let us start by considering a positive straight line ωω′ and all the points
lying on this set. These combinations form a preferential set. All the points
on the north-west of O′ such as V ′ are preferred to M , while those on the
south-east of O such as V are non-preferred to M. Postulate A. guarantees
the existence of a unique point µ representing an indiﬀerence combination to
M. Now let us consider the family of lines parallel to ωω′ intersecting the CD
from O to M. For each line we can deﬁne a point µ indiﬀerent to M. Hence
it is possible to deﬁne the locus of µ. We can construct the two tangent lines
to the locus of µ in M, which are
−−→
Mw and
−−−→
Mw1, respectively.
Through this construction we ﬁnd the prefence and nonpreference di-
rections. The ﬁrst will be all the directions from w1 up to w obtained through
an anticlockwise rotation (e.g. v). All the others will be nonproference direc-
tions (e.g. v′). What we mean by preference direction is that the consumer
will move in that sense when possible.
At this point the third postulate is presented:
C. The limiting directions
−−→
Mw and
−−−→
Mw1 are vertically opposite.
The hypotesis in C. is essentially a smoothness assumption. What the author
wants to state by postulating C. is that the direction identiﬁed by ww1 is
somehow the indiﬀerence direction. What does this mean? The idea is
that the locus of µ will be the indiﬀerence curve we were looking for and
the straight line ww1 is the tangent to the curve. Notice that we are not
yet authorized to speak about indiﬀerence curves as we have not deﬁned
them. What we can say is that the assumption expresses the fact that
the individual will exchange either x1 for x2 or x2 for x1 at any given rate
of exchange, with the exception of that rate which equals the slope of the
corresponding indiﬀerence elements. Roughly speaking, C. guarantees the
absence of points of non-diﬀerentiability and this assumption guarantees the
possibility of proceeding in our construction.
The last assumption refers to the behaviour of the indiﬀerence curve when
the direction of ωω′ changes:
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D. The indiﬀerence direction at any point is uniquely determined.
Let us now suppose that Postulate A, B, C and D are simultaneously valid,
then a construction such as that in FIGURE 5.1 can be considered. Con-
sumer's preference will be described through a diﬀerential equation as follows:
ϕ1(x1, x2)dx1 + ϕ2(x1, x2)dx2 = 0, withϕ1( ), ϕ2( ) ≥ 0, (5.1)
where the inequality is satisﬁed strictly at least for one of the two func-
tions.
The construction made so far may be traced in the case of three or more
goods. When, for example, we have the case of a 3-goods-economy we should
think of the case where the choice of the individual is limited to the combi-
nations represented by a plane which passes through a preference direction
positive inclined with respect to all coordinate axes, we reach the result that
the indiﬀerence element is represented by the total diﬀerential equation
ϕ1(x1, x2, x3)dx1 + ϕ2(x1, x2, x3)dx2 + ϕ3(x1, x2, x3)dx3 = 0, (5.2)
which in the n− goods case becomes
n∑
i=1
ϕi(x1, x2, ..., xn)dxi = 0. (5.3)
The main idea is that a direction deﬁned by an increment (4x1,4x2, ...,
4xn) is an indiﬀerent direction if
∑n
i=1 ϕi(x1, x2, ..., xn)4xi = 0. At this
point the author speciﬁes that some other conditions on the function ϕi( )
should be added in (5.3) to obtain the result we are looking for. If for the case
expressed by (5.1) we have not integrability problem or at least we solved
this problem (cfr. [18]), when we consider a more-than-2-goods-economy the
situation could become a little bit tricky. In this regard Professor Georgescu
introduced a stability equilibrium concept. Let us be given the point M
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deﬁned above and consider an indiﬀerent direction deﬁned by
−−−→
MM ′. That
is, M ′ is chosen is such a way that
−−−→
MM ′ is an indiﬀerence direction for M.
Now we will face an equilibrium stability situation if the direction deﬁned by−−−→
MM ′ is a non-preference direction for M ′. The condition of stability of an
equilibrium in mechanics can be satisﬁed, roughly speaking, if when we move
a body slightly from one point of equilibrium to an other it will naturally
go back to the ﬁrst one. Let us analyze in more detail this condition.
As we already did in previous situations (cfr. chapter 1) we will choose
the function ϕ1( ) as numeraire and we will deﬁne n− 1 new functions given
by B2 =
ϕ2( )
ϕ1( )
, B3 =
ϕ3( )
ϕ1( )
, ... , Bn =
ϕn( )
ϕ1( )
.
Dividing (5.3) by ϕ1( ) and considering that
−−−→
MM ′ is an indiﬀerence di-
rection, we get
n∑
i=1
ϕi
ϕ1
4xi = 4x1 +
n∑
i=2
Bi4xi = L = 0, (5.4)
with 4xi suﬃciently small.
Let us consider the ﬁrst-order Taylor approximation of B1, B2, ..., Bn in
x+4x = (x1 +4x1, ..., x+4xn) deﬁned in such a way that it results exactly
M ′ = M ′(x +4x). If we do not consider the terms from the second order
on, we get
Bi(x+4x) ∼= Bi(x) +
n∑
j=1
δBi(x)
δxj
4xj, for every i ∈ {2, ..., n} . (5.5)
When we introduced (5.3) we speciﬁed how the sign of equality in the
equation is equivalent to say that the direction deﬁned by an increment
(4x1,4x2, ...,4xn) is an indiﬀerent direction. The condition of the stable
equilibrium would be given by analogy requiring that (5.3) holds with strict
inequality (<) for M ′ when the direction is given by
−−−→
MM ′ = (4x1,4x2, ...,
4xn). I am sure that no ambiguity arises in using the same symbolism in
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denoting the general increment (4x1,4x2, ...,4xn) and the speciﬁc one for−−−→
MM ′.
Hence in our case it must result:
4x1 +
n∑
i=2
Bi(x+4x)4xi < 0. (5.6)
(5.6) can be restated, in the light of (5.4) and (5.5), as:
n∑
i=2
n∑
j=1
δBi(x)
δxj
4xj4xi < 0. (5.7)
I want to stress that condition (5.7) really looks like a condition of nega-
tive deﬁniteness for a certain unspeciﬁed matrix S.
We just conﬁne ourselves to the intuition. Starting from this consideration
we analyze how (5.7) can be considered as satisﬁed when subject to (5.4).
In fact rearranging (5.7) we have:
n∑
i=2
(
δBi(x)
δx1
4x1 +
n∑
j=2
δBi(x)
δxj
4xj)4xi =
4x1
n∑
i=2
δBi(x)
δx1
4xi +
n∑
i=2
(
n∑
j=2
δBi(x)
δxj
4xj)4xi < 0. (5.8)
We can obtain, from (5.4), 4x1 = −
∑n
j=2Bj4xj, in such a way that
(5.8) is equivalent to
F = −
n∑
i=2
(
n∑
j=2
Bj
δBi(x)
δx1
4xj)4xi +
n∑
i=2
(
n∑
j=2
δBi(x)
δxj
4xj)4xi =
n∑
i=2
n∑
j=2
(
δBi(x)
δxj
−Bj δBi(x)
δx1
)4xj4xi < 0. (5.9)
Now the intuition we grasped becomes exploitable. Indeed condition (5.9)
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is now equivalent to the negative semideﬁniteness of the (n− 1) × (n − 1)
square matrix S =‖ δBi(x)
δxj
− Bj δBi(x)δx1 ‖i,j=2,...,n . It is possible to rewrite the
inequality in (5.9) as
F =
1
2
n∑
i=2
n∑
j=2
fij4xj4xi < 0, (5.10)
where it is assumed
fij = fji =
δBi(x)
δxj
−Bj δBi(x)
δx1
+
δBj(x)
δxi
−Bi δBj(x)
δx1
, i, j = 2, 3, ..., n. (5.11)
Note 5.3 The author seems to come, or at least to get very close to the
fundamental condition of negative semideﬁniteness of the Slutsky Matrix,
while he completely bypasses any symmetry condition.
Hence Matrix S will be deﬁned as
S =
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
f22 f23 ... f2n
f32 ...
...
fn2 ... fnn
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
,
and using a familiar criterion ( ) we can say that matrix S is negative semidef-
inite iff
|f22| < 0;
∣∣∣∣∣ f22 f23f32 f33
∣∣∣∣∣ > 0; ... (5.12)
By some tedious algebraic operations that I will not dwell on we arrive to
say that the system in (5.7) subject to (5.4) is satisﬁed when the principal
minors, including always the elements of the ﬁrst row and column, of the
determinant
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D =
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
0 1 B2 B3 ... Bn
1 0 B2,1 B3,1 ... Bn,1
B2 B2,1 2B2,2 B2,3 +B3,2 ... B2,n +Bn,2
B3 B3,1 B3,2 +B2,3 2B3,3 ... B3,n +Bn,3
... ... ... ... ...
Bn Bn,1 Bn,2 +B2,n Bn,3 +B3,n ... 2Bn,n
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
(5.13)
are, starting with the third order, alternatively positive and negative;
i.e,
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 1 B2
1 0 B2,1
B2 B2,1 2B2,2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ > 0;
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 1 B2 B3
1 0 B2,1 B3,1
B2 B2,1 2B2,2 B2,3 +B3,2
B3 B3,1 B3,2 +B2,3 2B3,3
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
< 0, ....
(5.14)
Now let us denote by Φ the expression in (5.6), and take its second-order
Taylor expansion:
Φ = 4x1 +
n∑
i=2
Bi(x+4x)4xi u
u L+ a2L2 − L21 − L22 − ...− L2n−1, (5.15)
where L1, L2, ..., Ln−1 are linear functions of 4x1,4x2, ...,4xn, L is de-
ﬁned in (5.4) and the second equality in (5.15) is a consequence of (5.14).
We will not dwell with the mathematical details of what follows but it is
important to grasp the intuition.
Φ = 0 represents a quadratic and L = 0 is its tangent plane. Let us
consider a small movement from the origin, then it results:
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Φ < 0, if L ≤ 0.
Hence we can restate (5.6) as:
4x1 +
n∑
i=2
Bi(x+4x)4xi < 0, if 4x1 +
n∑
i=2
Bi(x)4xi ≤ 0. (5.16)
(5.16) becomes our necessary and suﬃcient stability condition and can
be interpreted as any direction (4x1,4x2, ...,4xn) which constitutes for
M(x1, x2, ..., xn) either an indiﬀerence or a non-preference direction, will be
a non-preference direction for the inﬁnitesimally-near pointM(x1+4x1, x2+
4x2, ..., xn +4xn).
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6 The Problem of Integrability in Utility The-
ory, P.A. Samuelson
We want to present the main results reached in The Problem of Integrability
in Utility Theory by P. A. Samuelson (cfr. [18]). As usual let us consider an
economy with n consumption goods. Let's consider the same hypotheses we
made so far on the demand function x(p,M) = (x1(p,M), x2(p,M), ..., xn(p,M)),
i.e.
i) x( ) is diﬀerentiable;
ii) x( ) is homogeneous of degree zero;
iii) budget exhaustion.
At this point the author introduces a further hypothesis:
iv) the demand function is invertible.
We want to ﬁnd a mathematical criterion equivalent to assumption iv).
Using i), ii) and iii) from Proposition 3.6 we get
S(p,M)p =
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
dh1
dp1
... dh1
dpn
... ... ...
dhn
dp1
... dhn
dpn
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 p1...
pn
 = (6.1)
=
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
δx1
δp1
+ δx1
δM
x1 ...
δx1
δpn
+ δx1
δM
x1
... ... ...
δxn
δp1
+ δx1
δM
xn ...
δxn
δpn
+ δxn
δM
xn
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
 p1...
pn
 = 0
Since we assumed positive prices and positive income (6.1) implies S(p,M)
to be singular. In fact, ab absurdo, detS(p,M) 6= 0 the nul vector price would
be the only solution of the system Sp = 0.
Let us consider the implicit function theorem (cfr. [20]) for our frame-
work.
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We have F : Rn+n+1 → Rn, where
F (x1, x2, ..., xn, p1, p2, ...., pn,M) =

x1 − x1(p1, p2, ..., pn,M)
...
xn − xn(p1, p2, ..., pn,M)
M −M

and if it results that the matrix∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
δx1
δp1
... δx1
δpn
... ... ...
δxn
δp1
... δxn
δpn
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ is non singular, (6.2)
(from det
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
δx1
δp1
... δx1
δpn
δx1
δM
... ... ... ...
δxn
δp1
... δxn
δpn
δxn
δM
0 ... 0 1
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
6= 0), then it is possible to get

p1 = p1(x1, x2, ..., xn)
...
pn = pn(x1, x2, ..., xn)
M = M(x1, x2, ..., xn)
.
Hence condition iv) is completely equivalent to (6.2).
Let's consider, for convenience, a new set of variables. By ﬁxing the n−th
price as the numeraire we have:
(B1, B2, ..., Bn−1, Bn) = (
p1
pn
,
pn
pn
, ...,
pn−1
pn
,
M
pn
).
In this case when hypothesis iv) holds it is possible to invert the demand
function to get
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
B1 = B1(x1, x2, ..., xn)
...
Bn−1 = Bn−1(x1, x2, ..., xn)
; (6.3)
and since iii) is valid we get Bn =
M
pn
= B1x1+B2x2+...+Bn−1xn−1+
pn
pn
xn.
We can note that the implicit function theorem is valid in this new frame-
work if the determinant of the jacobian of F ∗ with respect to B1,B2,...,Bn is
non-zero, where
F ∗ =
 x1 − x1(
p1
pn
, ..., pn−1
pn
, M
pn
)
...
xn − xn( p1pn , ...,
pn−1
pn
, M
pn
)
 =
 x1 − x1(B1, ..., Bn)...
xn − xn(B1, ..., Bn)
 .
The implicit function theorem states that
Bx1,x2,...,xn = −J−1B1,...,Bn(F )Jx1,x2,...,xn(F ).
Since Jx1,x2,...,xn(F
∗) is the n× n identity matrix we have that
J−1B1,...,Bn(F
∗) =

δB1
δx1
... δB1
δxn
... ... ...
δBn
δx1
... δBn
δxn
 = ( ( δBiδxj )i,j=1,...,n−1 ( δBiδxn )i=1,...n−1
( δBn
δxj
)j=1,...n−1 δBnδxn
)
,
where we use a block-matrix representation in the last equality.
By using some algebraic manipulation we have
J−1B1,...,Bn(F
∗) =
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
1 0 ... 0
0 1
... ... 0
0 ... 0 1
0
(xj)j=1,...,n−1 1
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
∗
∥∥∥∥∥ ( δBiδxj −Bj δBiδxn )i,j=1,...,n−1 ( δBiδxn )i=1,...n−10 1
∥∥∥∥∥ ∗
66
∗∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
1 0 ... 0
0 1
... ... 0
0 ... 0 1
0
(Bj)j=1,...,n−1 1
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
. (6.4)
It has been shown that if an integrable utility function U( ) exists then
the Slutsky Matrix S = ( δxi
δpj
+ δxi
δM
xj)i,j=1,...,n is symmetric, as the equality
δ2U
δpiδpj
= δ
2U
δpjδpi
must hold. We can rewrite
S =
∥∥∥∥∥ ( δxiδpj + δxiδM xj)i,j=1,...,n−1 ( δxiδpn + δxiδM xn)i=1,...,n−1( δxn
δpj
+ δxn
δM
xj)j=1,...,n−1 δxnδpn +
δxn
δM
xn
∥∥∥∥∥ =
∥∥∥∥∥ Sn sinsnj snn
∥∥∥∥∥ .
(6.5)
From (6.1) we have that S is a singular matrix. Hence it would be suﬃ-
cient to prove the symmetry of Sn. That is we have
(n−1)(n−2)
2
conditions to
verify.
It is possible to show that
JB1,...,Bn(F ) = J =
∥∥∥∥∥ ( δxiδpj )i,j=1,...,n−1 ( δxiδpn )i=1,...,n−1( δxn
δpj
)j=1,...,n−1 δxnδpn
∥∥∥∥∥ .
Hence we can rewrite
∥∥∥∥∥ Sn ( δxiδpn )i=1,...,n−1snj δxnδpn
∥∥∥∥∥ = J
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
1 0 ... 0
0 1
... ... 0
0 ... 0 1
0
(xj)j=1,...,n−1 1
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
,
and by using (6.4) we get
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∥∥∥∥∥ Sn ( δxiδpn )i=1,...,n−1snj δxnδpn
∥∥∥∥∥ =
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
1 0 ... 0
0 1
... ... 0
0 ... 0 1
0
(Bj)j=1,...,n−1 1
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
−1
∗
∗
∥∥∥∥∥ ( δBiδxj −Bj δBiδxn )i,j=1,...,n−1 ( δBiδxn )i=1,...n−10 1
∥∥∥∥∥
−1
=
=
∥∥∥∥∥ [( δBiδxj −Bj δBiδxn )i,j=1,...,n−1]−1 ( )i=1,...n−1( )j=1,...,n−1 ( )
∥∥∥∥∥ .
In order to prove the symmetry of (6.4) we just have to show that
[( δBi
δxj
− Bj δBiδxn )i,j=1,...,n−1] is symmetric. What we found is exactly the condi-
tion presented by Antonelli (cfr. 2.23).
Using (6.3) we deﬁne the following system of diﬀerential equations
− δxn
δx1
= B1(x1, x2, ..., xn)
...
− δxn
δxn−1
= Bn−1(x1, x2, ..., xn)
; (6.6)
and the total diﬀerential equation
B1dx1 +B2dx2 + ...+Bn−1dxn−1 + dxn = 0. (6.7)
We term an indiﬀerence path a path satisfying (6.7). We can consider
Q1dx1 +Q2dx2 + ...+Qn−1dxn−1 +Qndxn = 0, (6.8)
in place of (6.7), where Qn( ) is a non-zero function and Qi = QnBi.
Let us recall some fundamental results on the theory of total diﬀerential
equation.
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Deﬁnition 6.1 (cfr. [7]) Let V be a real linear space and let V ∗ be
the space Hom (V,R) . Then the map < ·, · >: V ∗ × V −→ R associating
to each couple (f, v) in V ∗ × V the value f (v) is said to be the duality
between V ∗ and V.
Deﬁnition 6.2.I Let Ψ be an open set of Rn then ω : Ψ → (Rn)∗ is
said to be a linear diﬀerential form in Ψ.
We can restate Deﬁnition 6.2.I as
Deﬁnition 6.2.II Let Ψ be an open set of Rn; then the map ω deﬁned
on Ψ is said to be a diﬀerential form if for every x ∈ Ψ it is associated a
linear form ω(x) : Rn −→ R, that is for every vector x ∈ Ψ we have a vector
g (x) = (g1(x), ...., gn(x)) ∈ Rn such that
ω(x)(v) = g(x) · v for every v ∈ Rn, (6.9)
where g ( ) is said to be the coeﬃcients vector of the diﬀerential form ω.
We will say that ω is continuous if g( ) is continuous and by analogy ω is said
to be of class Ck when g( ) is of class Ck.
Let us note that, when we denote by dxi the i− th linear form associating
with every vector v its i − th component, we can rewrite (6.9) in the more
usual aspect as:
ω(x1, ...., xn) =
n∑
i=1
gi(x1, ..., xn)dxi. (6.10)
Deﬁnition 6.3 Let ω be continuous, then we can deﬁne the line inte-
gral on the curve γ ∈ C1(x0, x1,Ψ) as
ˆ
γ
ω =
bˆ
a
g(γ(t)) · γ′(t)dt, (6.11)
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where a, b are the extremes of the interval along which the curve γ is
deﬁned.
Deﬁnition 6.4 Let ω be a diﬀerential form as above and g : Ψ −→ Rn
the coeﬃcients vector of ω. ω is said to be an exact diﬀerential if there
exists a function f : Ψ −→ R such that g = ∇f or equivalently ω = df.
Proposition 6.1 (cfr. [6]) Let ω be a continuous diﬀerential form.
Then it is equivalent:
d.i) ω is an exact diﬀerential;
d.ii)
´
γ
ω = 0, for every x ∈ Ψ and for every γ ∈ C1(x, x,Ψ);
d.iii)
´
γ
ω =
´
µ
ω, for every x0, x1 ∈ Ψ and for every γ, µ ∈ C1(x0, x1,Ψ).
d.ii) means that the integral over a closed path is 0 independently from
the path, while d.iii) is equivalent to say that any curves deﬁned between
the two integration points on which the integral is computed guarantees the
same value for the integration.
Deﬁnition 6.5 Under the hypotheses made so far a C1 diﬀerential form
is said to be closed iﬀ:
δgi
δxj
=
δgj
δxi
, for every i, j = 1, ..., n.
Lemma 6.1 (Poincaré) Let ω be a diﬀerential form of class C1. If ω
is closed and deﬁned on an open star domain then ω is an exact diﬀerential.
Let us go back to our integrability problem.
Referring to expression in (6.8) Samuelson says Only if
∑
Qkdxk = dQ,
is an exact differential with Qk = δQ
δxk
= Qk and Qkj = Qjk, will such
an integral be always the same for different paths between two speciﬁed
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end-points; and only in this case we can be sure that if we go from point A
to point B by one path and return back to A by an other path, the value of
the integral will none the less be zero over the round trip, indicating that A
is exactly as good as itself and no better.
The link with the Poincaré's Lemma is straightforward.
Instead of asking (6.8) to be an exact diﬀerential, we will look for the
existence of an integrating factor. That is, we are asking whether there
exists a function I (x1, ..., xn) such that
I
∑
Qkdxk = dV is an exact integral. (6.12)
(6.12) is equivalent to ask for the existence of a set of variable proportional
to B1, B2, ..., Bn−1guaranteeing the diﬀerential form in (6.7) to be integrable.
In order to have the hypotheses of the Poincaré's Lemma we should ask
for
δ2V
δxjδxi
=
δI
δxi
Qj + I
δQj
δxi
=
δI
δxj
Qi + I
δQi
δxj
=
δ2V
δxiδxj
,
for every i, j = 1, ..., n, i 6= j. (6.13)
or, equivalently,
δI
δxi
Qj − δI
δxj
Qi + I(
δQj
δxi
− δQ
i
δxj
) = 0. (6.14)
After some simple algebraic manipulation (6.14) can be restated as
Qi(
δQj
δxn
− δQ
n
δxj
) +Qj(
δQn
δxi
− δQ
i
δxn
) +Qn(
δQi
δxj
− δQ
j
δxi
) = 0,
for every i, j = 1, ..., n− 1, i 6= j. (6.15)
Let us now recall that we have previously deﬁned Qk = BkQn, k ∈
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{1, 2, ..., n} . Hence after some algebraic manipulation (cfr. [24]) we can re-
state (6.15) as
δBi
δxj
−Bj δB
i
δxn
=
δBj
δxi
−Bi δB
j
δxn
,
for every i, j = 1, ..., n− 1, i 6= j, (6.16)
which are exactly Antonelli's integrability conditions (cfr. 2.23).
As we already mentioned in the introduction we want to stress that the
conditions in 6.16 are not suﬃcient to solve our integrability problem. Next
chapter will clarify this point.
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7 Utility, Demand and Preference, Ch. 6, L.
Hurwicz & H. Uzawa
Chapter 6 of [3] by L. Hurwicz and H. Uzawa can be considered as the ﬁnal
solution of the integrability problem. In this section we will focus on this
work. Some additional considerations will complete our analysis.
As usual let us consider an economy where an n − dimension vector of
consumption goods is represented by x = (x1, x2, ..., xn) ∈ Rn+ and prices
are given by the n-tuple (p1, p2, ..., pn) ∈ Rn++ = Π. We will denote by x =
x(p,M) the demand function associating to the couple (p,M) (where M
measure the income) the consumption bundle x. Let's assume price system
p and income M range in the set Ω =
{
(p,M) : p ∈ Rn++, M ∈ Rn+
}
.
We will consider the following assumptions when necessary:
(A) x(p,M) is a semipositive single-valued function deﬁned for each
(p,M)∈ Ω;
(B) the budget constraint is satisﬁed with equality, i.e px(p,M) = M,
for each (p,M)∈ Ω;
(D) xi(p,M) is diﬀerentiable on Ω for every i = 1, 2, ..., n;
(E) For any positive α′, α′′ there exists a positive Kα′,α′′ such that, for
each i = 1, 2, ..., n, it is | δxi(p,M)
δM
|≤ Kα′,α′′ for (p,M)Ω and pj ∈
[α′, α′′], for any j = 1, 2, ..., n.
Let us denote by X the image set of the function x(p,M). Using the demand
function and assuming (D) it is possible to deﬁne the Slutsky matrix as
S(p,M) = ‖Si,j(p,M)‖i,j=1,..,n , (7.1)
where Si,j(p,M) =
δxi(p,M)
δpj
+
δxi(p,M)
δM
xj(p,M).
(7.1) is said to be
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(S) symmetric if Si,j(p,M) = Sj,i(p,M) for every i, j = 1, 2, ..., n and for
each (p,M)∈ Ω;
(N)negative semindefinite if vTS(p,M)v ≤ 0 for all vRn and for all (p,M)∈
Ω.
We will now present a theorem guaranteeing property (S) and (N) to be ver-
iﬁed starting from assuming some regularity conditions for the utility maxi-
mization.
Theorem 7.1 Let us consider a preference relation R deﬁned on the
set of all conceivable commodity bundles with nonnegative vector with the
following properties:
P.I* Reﬂexivity;
P.II* Completeness;
P.III* Transitivity
and let x( ), satisfying (A), (B) and (D), be the unique maximizer of the
preference relation subject to the budget inequality px ≤M .
Then the Slutsky matrix S(p,M) satisﬁes properties (S) and (N).
Proof Let (p0,M0) be a point in Ω with x0 = x(p0,M0). We can deﬁne
the set
K =
{
x ∈ Rn+ such that xRx0
}
. (7.2)
Let us introduce the so called expenditure function as
µ(p) = inf
xK
px (7.3)
We ﬁrst prove the concavity of µ( ).
74
Let's consider two couples (p, x) , (p1, x1) satisfying µ(p) = px and µ(p1) =
p1x1 respectively.
Then let's deﬁne p2 = tp+ (1− t)p1, t ∈ [0, 1] as the convex combination
of the two prices systems p, p1 and let p2x2 = µ(p2).
We have p2x2 = tpx2+(1−t)p1x2, where, in general, it is
px2 ≥ µ(p)p1x2 ≥ µ(p1) .
Hence, using p2x2 = µ(p2) it is µ(p2) = p2x2 ≥ tµ(p) + (1− t)µ(p1).
From the concavity we can immediately obtain the continuity of µ( ).
Now let us deﬁne
X(p) = x(p, µ(p)) for all p ∈ Π. (7.4)
X( ) is continuous as combination of continuous functions. Now, using
(B) we get
pX(p) = µ(p) for all p ∈ Π. (7.5)
We want to prove that for any p′ ∈ Π it is
pX(p) ≤ pX(p′) (7.6)
Let's consider a sequence (xn)nN such that x
nPx, for every nN and
limn→∞ p′xn = µ(p′) = infxK p′x.
By the deﬁnition of inf, for every positive real number, there exists an
index n such that p
′xn < µ(p′) +  for every n > n.
Let x = x(p′, µ(p′) + ). Using the deﬁnition of demand function, x is
the unique maximizer subject to the constraint p′x ≤ µ(p′) + . Therefore,
p′xn < µ(p′) +  implies xPxn which means x ∈ K.
Using the continuity of the demand function x( ) we have lim→0 x =
X(p′).
Let us consider the two case:
1) X(p) ∈ K;
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2) X(p) /∈ K.
In 1), X (p) minimizes over K the function px. And since x ∈ K, it is
pX (p) ≤ px for all . Taking the limit we get pX (p) ≤ pX(p′).
In 2) x0PX (p) . Since xnPx0, xPxn, for the transitivity, xPX(p). Ab
absurdo suppose pX (p) > pX(p′). Using the continuity assumption, for small
, it is pX (p) > px. Thus x is more desirable than X (p) and cheaper at
price p. We found a contradiction as X (p) does not maximize satisfaction
subject to the budget constraint. It must be pX(p) ≤ pX(p′). Hence we have
(7.6).
We want to prove that we can deﬁne the δµ
δpj
for every j = 1, 2, ..., n. We
have:
δµ
δpj
= Xj(p) for each j = 1, 2, ..., n. (7.7)
Take two system of prices p, (p+4p), consider X(p), X(p+4p) respec-
tively.
We have pX (p) ≤ pX (p+4p) , that is
p4X(p) ≥ 0, (7.8)
where 4X(p) = X(p+4p)−X(p).
Furthermore, considering (7.8), it is
4µ(p) = µ(p+4p)− µ(p) = (p+4p)(X(p) +4X(p))− pX(p) =
= p4X(p) +4pX(p) +4p4X(p) ≥ 4pX(p) +4p4X(p).
Hence
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4µ(p) ≥ 4pX(p) +4p4X(p). (7.9)
Let 's consider a particular vector4p = (0, ..., 0,4pj, 0, ..., 0), with4pj >
0, using (7.9):
4µ(p)
4pj ≥ X
j(p) +4Xj(p).
If we take the limit we have
lim
4pj→0+
4µ(p)
4pj ≥ X
j(p). (7.10)
In fact from the continuity of X( ), lim4pj→04Xj(p) = 0, where the
existence of the limit is guaranteed by the concavity of µ.
When we consider 4pj < 0, we have, by analogy,
lim
4pj→0−
4µ(p)
4pj ≤ X
j(p). (7.11)
Combining (7.10) and (7.11) we get
lim
4pj→0−≤0
4µ(p)
4pj ≤ X
j(p) ≤ lim
4pj→0+
4µ(p)
4pj . (7.12)
Note that since µ(p) is concave in p it is
lim
4pj→0−
4µ(p)
4pj ≥ lim4pj→0+
4µ(p)
4pj . (7.13)
Hence, considering (7.12) we prove the existence of δµ
δpj
and the validity
of (7.7). The continuity of δµ
δpj
is a direct consequence of the continuity of
Xj(p).
Now let us take the partial derivative of Xj( ) with respect to pi:
δXj
δpi
=
δxj(p, µ(p))
δpi
+
δxj(p, µ(p))
δµ(p)
δµ(p)
δpi
=
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=
δxj(p, µ(p))
δpi
+
δxj(p, µ(p))
δM
xi(p, µ(p)); (7.14)
this expression is exactly δ
2µ
δpjδpi
. We want to show that M0 = µ(p0). By deﬁ-
nition we have M0 ≥ µ(p0) and in order to prove the equality it is suﬃcient
to have M0 ≯ µ(p0). Let us suppose that, ab absurdo, M0 > µ(p0), then
there exists x′ such that x′Px0 and p0x0 > p0x′, that is a contradiction as we
would have x′ ∈ x(p0,M0).
Hence for every (p0,M0) it is
δ2µ
δpjδpi
(p0) = Sji(p
0,M0). (7.15)
From (7.15), using Young Theorem on the symmetry of second derivatives
(cfr. [12]) and the property of concave function we have that the Slutsky
matrix just deﬁned is symmetric and negative semideﬁnite, i.e. property (S)
and (N) hold.

At this point, we would like to present some theorems guaranteeing the
existence of a utility function generating the demand function, starting by
assuming some regularity conditions such as the symmetry and the semidef-
initeness of the Slutsky matrix.
Theorem 7.2 Let the demand function x(p,M) satisfy conditions (A),
(B), (D) and (E). If the Slutsky matrix satisﬁes (S) and (N), then there exists
a utility function u( ) deﬁned on the range X of the demand function x(p,M)
such that the value of x(p,M) of the demand at (p,M) uniquely maximizes
u(x) over the usual budget set.
In order to prove Theorem 7.2 we would present some preliminary results.
Theorem 7.2.I (cfr. existence Theorem III, Mathematical Ap-
pendix, [3] ) For each i ∈ {1, ..., n} let fi : Ω = Π × Θ ⊆ Rn × R −→ R,
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with
2.1.i) Π = {x = (x1, x2, ..., xn) such that xi > 0, i = 1, 2, ..., n};
2.1.ii) Θ = {z such that 0 ≤ z <∞},
satisfying
(D) for each i ∈ {1, ..., n}fi ( , ) is diﬀerentiable in Ω;
(S) δfi(x,z)
δxj
+ δfi(x,z)
δz
fj(x, z) =
δfj(x,z)
δxi
+
δfj(x,z)
δz
fi(x, z), for each i, j ∈
{1, ..., n} ;
(O) for each i ∈ {1, ..., n}fi (x, 0) = 0,for any x ∈ Π;
(E) for any positive α′, α′′ there exists a positive Kα′,α′′ such that,
for each i = 1, 2, ..., n, it is | δfi(x,z)
δz
|≤ Kα′,α′′ for all (x, z) ∈
Ω and xj ∈ [α′, α′′], j = 1, 2, ..., n.
Then for every (x0, z0) there exists a unique continuous solution ω(x0,z0)(x)
of the following system:
(P )(x0,z0)

δz
δx1
= f1(x1, x2, ..., xn, z)
δz
δx2
= f2(x1, x2, ..., xn, z)
....
δz
δxn
= fn(x1, x2, ..., xn, z)
. (7.16)
Note 7.1 Let us consider the following system of diﬀerential equation:
δM
δp1
= x1(p1, p2, ..., pn,M)
δM
δp2
= x1(p1, p2, ..., pn,M)
....
δM
δpn
= xn(p1, p2, ..., pn,M)
. (7.17)
We can observe that (7.17) is equivalent to (7.16) and since all the hy-
potheses of Theorem 7.2.I are satisﬁed we can state the following:
79
Lemma 7.1 Let the demand function x (p,M) satisfy the conditions
(A), (D), (E) and (S). Then the system (7.17) has a unique solution for any
initial condition (p∗,M∗) ∈ Ω. That is, there exists a unique continuous
function µp∗M∗( ) such that:µp∗M∗(p∗) = M∗δµp∗M∗(p)
δpi
= xi(p, µp∗M∗(p)) i = 1, 2, ..., n
, for all p ∈ Π.
Since in Lemma 7.1 the uniqueness of the solution is deduced we have:
Lemma 7.2 Let (p′,M ′) , (p′′,M ′′) ∈ Ω be two initial conditions guar-
anteeing
i) there exists p0 ∈ Π such that µp′M ′(p0) = µp′′M ′′(p0);
then it is
ii) µp′M ′(p) = µp′′M ′′(p), for all p ∈ Π.
Lemma 7.3 Let (p′,M ′) , (p′′,M ′′) ∈ Ω be two initial conditions guar-
anteeing
j) there exists p0 ∈ Π such that µp′M ′(p0) < µp′′M ′′(p0);
then it is
jj) µp′M ′(p) < µp′′M ′′(p), for all p ∈ Π.
Proof Let us suppose, ab absurdo, that there exists p0, p∗ ∈ Π such
that µp′M ′(p
0) < µp′′M ′′(p
0) and µp′M ′(p
∗) ≥ µp′′M ′′(p∗), that is j) is valid and
jj) is violated for some value p∗ ∈ Π.
Let's consider the convex combination of p0 and p∗ given by
pt = tp∗ + (1− t)p0, t ∈ [0, 1],
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and deﬁne the function ϕ : [0, 1]→ R as
ϕ(t) = µp′M ′(p
t)− µp′′M ′′(pt). (7.18)
It results that the function in (7.18) is continuous as combination of
continuous functions and it is:
ϕ(0) = µp′M ′(p
0)− µp′′M ′′(p0) < 0,
ϕ(1) = µp′M ′(p
∗)− µp′′M ′′(p∗) ≥ 0,
where the two inequalities hold as immediate consequence of the hypothe-
ses on p0, p∗ ∈ Π. As a consequence of the Intermediate Existence Theorem
we can state: there exists t˜ ∈ (0, 1] such that ϕ(t˜) = 0, i.e there is a vector
pt˜ = t˜p∗ + (1− t˜)p0 with µp′M ′(pt˜) = µp′′M ′′(pt˜). From Lemma 7.2 we would
deduce
µp′M ′(p) = µp′′M ′′(p), for all p ∈ Π,
which is clearly a contradiction of j).

The idea is that the function µpM(p
∗) will be used to construct the utility
function u(x) on the domain given by the image of x(p,M), denoted by X.
In fact given an arbitrary ﬁxed p∗ we will deﬁne for any x ∈ X
u(x) = Up∗(x) = µpM(p∗),
where (p,M) represents any couple satisfying x = x(p,M).
We will proceed as follows: ﬁrst we will prove that the value of Up∗(x),
for any given p∗, is independent from the choice on (p,M) given the validity
of the relation x = x(p,M) (cfr. Lemma 7.7). Afterward we will show that
Up∗ ( ) is a utility function (cfr. Lemma 7.8).
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Lemma 7.4, Lemma 7.5 and Lemma 7.6 will be used to prove these two
results.
Lemma 7.4 Let us consider two couples (p0,M0) , (p1,M1) satisfying:
k) x0 = x(p0,M0) 6= x1 = x(p1,M1);
kk) M1 ≥ µp0M0(p1).
Then
p0x1 > p0x0. (7.19)
Proof Let us assume:
Case 1) kk) holds with equality, i.e. M1 = µp0M0(p
1).
Let's consider the convex combination of p0, p1 as
pt = tp1 + (1− t)p0, t ∈ [0, 1] (7.20)
and deﬁne
M t = µp0M0(p
t), xt = x(pt,M t). (7.21)
We will denote by ψ : [0, 1] −→ R the function
ψ(t) = p0xt = p0x(tp1 + (1− t)p0, µp0M0(tp1 + (1− t)p0)) (7.22)
The expression in (7.22) is diﬀerentiable for the hypotheses assumed in
Theorem 7.2. Hence we have:
dψ(t)
dt
= p0
δx
δpt
(p1 − p0) + p0 δx
δµ
δµ
δpt
(p1 − p0) =
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= p0[
δx
δpt
+
δx
δµ
δµ
δpt
](p1 − p0) = p0S(pt,M t)(p1 − p0), (7.23)
where S(pt,M t) is the Slutsky Matrix.
By diﬀerentiating the budget equation ptxt = M t in t we have:
dpt
dt
xt + pt
dxt
dt
=
dM t
dt
,
that is
ptS(pt,M t)(p1 − p0) = 0. (7.24)
When we subtract (7.24) from (7.23) we have
dψ(t)
dt
= p0S(pt,M t)(p1 − p0)− ptS(pt,M t)(p1 − p0) =
= −t(p1 − p0)S(pt,M t)(p1 − p0). (7.25)
Using the negative semideﬁniteness of the Slutsky Matrix we have that
(p1 − p0)S(pt,M t)(p1 − p0) ≤ 0. Hence
dψ(t)
dt
≥ 0, for every t ∈ [0, 1].
It is straightforward to deduce
ψ(0) = p0x0 ≤ p0x1 = ψ(1), (7.26)
and if we prove that ψ(0) 6= ψ(1) we have (7.19).
Let's suppose, ab absurdo, ψ(0) = ψ(1), then it is dψ(t)
dt
= 0, for every t ∈
[0, 1] which gives
(p1 − p0)S(pt,M t)(p1 − p0) = 0 = (p1 − p0)dx
t
dt
, (7.27)
where the second equality is given using the deﬁnition of xt.
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We get dx
t
dt
= 0, which implies
x1 = x0, (7.28)
in contradiction with k).
Case 2) kk) holds with strict inequality, i.e. M1 > µp0M0(p
1).
We have M1 = µp1M1(p
1), hence we can restate kk) as
µp1M1(p
1) > µp0M0(p
1), (7.29)
and applying Lemma 7.3 µp1M1(p) > µp0M0(p), for all p ∈ Π, and in
particular it results
µp1M1(p
0) > µp0M0(p
0) = M0. (7.30)
If we prove
µp1M1(p
0) ≤ p0x1, (7.31)
from (7.30) we get p0x1 ≥ µp1M1(p0) > µp0M0(p0) = M0 = p0x0, which is
exactly kk).
It is possible to prove (7.31) following a line of argument which is analo-
gous to the one we used in Case 1).

Through the next Lemma we prove how WARP holds under the assump-
tions made so far.
Lemma 7.5 Let's consider two demand consumptions bundles x0 =
x(p0,M0) and x1 = x(p1,M1), satisfying p0x0 ≥ p0x1, with x0 6= x1.Then it
is
p1x0 > p1x1. (7.32)
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Proof The Proof of Lemma 7.5 is an immediate consequence of Lemma
7.3 and Lemma 7.4.
The two following Lemmas guarantee that the utility function we are
going to construct is well deﬁned, in the sense that it will give the same
result independently from the initial conditions we will ask to be respected.
Lemma 7.6 Let x ∈ X. Then the set
Ξ(x) = {(p,M) ∈ Ω such that x(p,M) = x}
is convex.
Proof Let's consider two pairs (p0,M0), (p1,M1) ∈ Ξ(x), or equiva-
lently x(p0,M0) = x(p1,M1) = x. From the hypothesis on budget exhaustion
we have:
p0x = M0, p1x = M1. (7.33)
We can deﬁne the convex combination of p0, p1 and M0,M1respectively
as
p(t) = tp1 + (1− t)p0, (7.34)
M(t) = tM1 + (1− t)M0. (7.35)
If we take
x(t) = x(p(t),M(t)), (7.36)
we can observe, as consequence of (7.33), (7.34), (7.35), that
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p(t)x = tp1x+ (1− t)p0x = tM1 + (1− t)M0 = M(t) = p(t)x(t). (7.37)
Now, if we get that x (t) = x, for every t ∈ [0, 1] we immediately get the
convexity of Ξ(x).
Let us suppose ab absurdo there exists t˜ ∈ (0, 1) such that x (t˜) 6= x,
then by the equality in (7.37) and Lemma 7.5 we would have
p0x < p0x(t˜), p1x < p1x(t˜). (7.38)
Let's ﬁrst multiply the two equations in (7.38) by (1−t˜) and t˜, respectively
and then sum the two new expression:
(1− t˜)p0x+ t˜p1x < (1− t˜)p0x(t˜) + t˜p1x(t˜). (7.39)
(7.39) can be restate as p(t˜)x < p(t˜)x(t˜), contradicting (7.37).

Lemma 7.7 Let x(p0,M0) = x(p1,M1), then
µp1M1(p) = µp0M0(p), for all p ∈ Π.
Proof Let p(t) = tp1 + (1 − t)p0, M(t) = tM1 + (1 − t)M0 be deﬁned
as in Lemma 7.6. We immediately have
x(p(t),M(t)) = x(p0,M0), t ∈ [0, 1], (7.40)
which guarantees dx(t)
dt
= 0. When we diﬀerentiate with respect to t the
budget exhaustion condition we get;
dM(t)
dt
= x(p(t),M(t))
dp(t)
dt
, t ∈ [0, 1]. (7.41)
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(7.41) satisﬁes the system of equations in (7.17) .
By applying Lemma 7.2 we have:
µp0M0(p(t)) = M(t), t ∈ [0, 1];
which gives µp0M0(p
1) = M(1) = M1, that can be used to apply Lemma 7.2
once again and get:
µp0M0(p) = µp1M1(p), for all p ∈ Π. (7.42)

In the following Lemma we will deﬁne the utility function we were looking
for. Theorem 7.2 is a direct consequence of Lemma 7.8.
Lemma 7.8 Let the demand function satisfy the hypotheses of Theorem
7.2. Then for any price p∗, the function
Up∗(x) = µpM(p∗), x ∈ x(p,M) (7.43)
is single-valued on X, and for any couple (p,M) it is
Up∗(x(p,M)) > Up∗(x), for any x ∈ X, such that
px ≤M, x 6= x(p,M). (7.44)
Proof Using Lemma 7.7 we can deduce the single-valuedness of the
function in (7.43).
Now, let's consider two couples (p0,M0), (p1,M1), and deﬁne x0 = x(p0,M0), x1 =
x(p1,M1). Let's assume
p0x1 ≤M0, x1 6= x0.
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Using Lemma 7.4 we immediately deduce:
µp1M1(p
1) = M1 < µp0M0(p
1),
which by Lemma 7.3 implies
µp1M1(p) < µp0M0(p), for all p ∈ Π. (7.45)
When we set p = p∗ (7.45) becomes µp1M1(p∗) < µp0M0(p∗), which is, by
deﬁnition, equivalent to
Up∗(x0) > Up∗(x1). (7.46)

Theorem 7.3 shows that the utility indicators presented in Theorem 7.2
deﬁne the same ordering for the considered commodities bundles.
Theorem 7.3 For any two positive price vectors, p∗ and p∗∗ the function
Up∗(x) = µ(p∗; p,m) and Up∗∗ (deﬁned by analogy from Up∗( )) induce the
same ordering on the range X of the demand function x(p,M).
We say that two real-valued functions, f (a) and g (a) , deﬁned on a set A
induce the same ordering on A if: for all a′, a′′ ∈ A, f (a′) > f(a′′) iff g(a′) >
g(a′′).
The two following theorems guarantee some regularity conditions for the
utility function introduced in Theorem 7.2.
Theorem 7.4 For any price vector p∗, Up∗(x) is monotone increasing
with respect to the vectorial ordering of X, and the indeﬀerence sets of the
function Up∗are strictly convex toward to the origin.
Theorem 7.5 Up∗(x) is upper − semicontinuous in x, for every choice
p∗.
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We will not provide the Proof of Theorem 7.3, Theorem 7.4 and Theorem
7.5.
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8 Conclusions
In this ﬁnal chapter we will summarize the main results we obtained so far
in order for the reader to have a complete framework on this work.
Let us ﬁrst consider the utility maximization problem as presented in
1.2. When the utility function u ( ) is a continuous function representing a
regular, locally nonsatiated, strictly convex preference relation the associ-
ated (derived from the demand function) Slutsky Matrix is symmetric and
negative semideﬁnite (Proposition 1.8). We obtained an equivalent result in
Theorem 7.1. In fact when we consider a preference relation R deﬁned on the
set of all conceivable commodity bundles satisfying reﬂexivity, completeness,
transitivity under the hypotheses (A), (B) and (D) (cfr. Chapter 7) on the
demand function we get the symmetry (S) and negative semideﬁnitness (N)
of the Slutsky Matrix. The other way round, as we show in Theorem 7.2,
if the demand function satisﬁes conditions (A), (B), (D) and (E) and the
Slutsky matrix satisﬁes (S) and (N) then there exists a utility function u( )
such that the value of the demand maximizes u( ) over the usual budget set.
We note that the hypotheses on the demand (Theorem 7.2) in one direc-
tion are stronger then those used in the other (Theorem 7.1). Indeed we are
obliged to assume (A), (B), (D) and (E) to get the following:
∃ a continuous, locally nonsatiated, convex utility function
generating the demand function.
m (8.1)
SlutskyMatrix satisfies (S) and (N).
This equivalence is a consequence of the premise above and of Theorem
90
7.3, Theorem 7.4 and Theorem 7.5.
We mentioned that in [14] Mas-Colell et al. showed that under the hy-
pothesis of the symmetry of the Slutsky Matrix the Weak Axiom and the
Strong Axiom are equivalent. Hence we can extend the equivalence in (8.1)
as follows:
∃ a continuous, locally nonsatiated, convex utiliy function
generating the demand function.
m (8.2)
SlutskyMatrix satisfies (S) and (N).
m (8.3)
SARP holds
m (8.4)
WARP and (R) are satisfied
where the equivalence in 8.4 is the result of Theorem 4.4 which guarantees
that the SARP holds if and only if the WARP and the Regularity Condition
(R) are both satised for the demand function subject to condition (A), (B),
(D) and (E). At this point the link between the integrability theory and
the revealed preference one should be clear when we take into consideration
what we remind hereinafter.
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In fact in Chapter 4 we show that, when (A), (B), (D), (E) and SARP
are satisﬁed the indirect revealed preference relation R∗ generated by the
demand function is a preference relation on the set of all positive commodity
bundles (i.e. R∗ satises P.I,...,P.V ) and the demand function is derived
from R∗(cfr. Theorem 4.1). We can move in the opposite direction through
Theorem 4.6 where, given a preference relation P on the set of all nonnegative
commodities (satisfying Axioms P.I,..., P.VI), it is proved the existence of a
demand function that is derived from the preference relation P, for which
(A), (B), (D) and SARP hold.
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